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INTRODUCTION 
This section provides an extended summary of my Ph.D. thesis, which is composed of three 
independent chapters. First chapter is considered as a review paper. Chapter 2 and 3 are the original 
research papers. The common denominator of the three papers is population and its impact on 
economic growth under the endogenous models with human capital accumulation. The next section 
will describe the incentives, the structure of the models, including the main assumptions, and the 
main results of each chapter.  
First chapter is a review-article that is largely associated with two literatures: International 
migration and economic growth. It is well known that human capital takes an important part in 
endogenous growth models. It makes a direct contribution to production with physical capital and is 
vital to sustain technological progress and innovation, which are crucial for the economic growth. 
Additionally, over many years, international migration has been one of the growing concerns of 
population change, which has various economic implications that can be either at macro or micro 
level. Given these facts, this chapter confines itself to consider solely the effects of migration on 
human capital accumulation. The motivation of this review is to identify how and to what extent 
migration is capable of impacting human capital formation in both migrant sending (home) and 
receiving (host) countries and thus, economic growth.  
The main purpose of this paper is to show that the linkage between migration and human 
capital accumulation has been evolving due to the changes in economic roles of migrants. Due to 
the methods of complexity in international migration research, this study required a multi-
dimensional perspective in order to evaluate the results in interactions between human capital 
accumulation and economic growth. The literature revealed that it is not easy to say that migration 
brings a net gain or leads to a net cost to the countries. Thus, we can conclude that the human 
capital-based growth effects of migration ranges according to the type of country analyzed (sending 
vs. receiving country), the duration of migration (temporary or permanent) and the heterogeneity in 
skill types of migrants (low or high-skilled).  
The main finding of this review is that that migration can affect the human capital 
accumulation via its impacts on three important factors: (i) Skill formation, (ii) Fertility and (iii) 
Wages (income levels). This review addresses precisely those points, that the changes in those 
factors generally drive many of the differences in results (either positive or negative or neutral) 
across studies. In home country analyses we evidenced that the increase in the return to education, 
investment in human capital may stimulate the migration decisions of individuals that have both 
4 
 
direct and indirect effects on skill composition, trade-off between quality and quantity of children, 
and the current (future) income levels. In addition to these findings, we also highlight the spill-over 
effects of migrants on natives’ and on companies’ investments in education and technology. 
Differences between natives’ and migrants’ preferences for having children have also critical roles 
in explaining the changes in human capital accumulation in host countries.   
The present review also shows that the modelling frameworks, and the assumptions which 
are subject to above-mentioned categorizations, leads to ambiguity in theoretical and empirical 
results across studies. For example, uncertainty and different migration probabilities are the key 
assumptions determining the strength of the impacts of migration on human capital accumulation. 
Most, recent relevant literature and case studies consider an economy with homogenous agents and 
exogenously given migration probabilities, however; a model with differentiated individuals and 
endogenous probability of migration may lead to more realistic results. It is also emphasized in the 
review that the assumptions are needed to be qualified by empirical observations. For instance, the 
results may also differ according to what extent migrants and natives are perfect (or imperfect 
substitutes) within skill groups. Chapter 1 reveals that further empirical studies would be important 
to verify the currently available theoretical results. Additionally the impacts of low-skilled 
migration and return migration on human capital accumulation may be paid much attention in 
endogenous growth models. 
Chapter 2 is an original theoretical paper entitled “Human Capital Accumulation under 
Skill-Biased Technological Change with Migration”. As the previous chapter points out, human 
capital-based growth effect of migration is steadily becoming one of the most interesting questions 
in the literature. This chapter intends to provide a complementary dimension to the directed 
technological change literature by incorporating human capital accumulation with skilled migration. 
The underlying reason for this chapter is the absence of the ongoing analyses on how skill-biased 
technological change (SBTC, hereafter) can potentially have an impact on human capital 
accumulation. The approach used in the model allows us to see the impact of technological change 
on human capital accumulation in both migrant receiving and sending countries jointly. Therefore, 
to the best of our knowledge, this research is the one of the very first attempts in trying to fill the 
aforementioned gap in economic growth and migration literatures.  
The present chapter has been built upon the following two arguments: First, technological 
development demands relatively more high skilled labour; thus, the return to education is higher 
under the skill-biased technological change. Second, as we know from the literature that, such an 
increase in the labour demand, which is mostly driven by SBTC, leads to an increase in skill-
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specific migration (brain drain) from technologically less developed countries to technologically 
advanced countries. Therefore, chapter 2 mainly rests on the following assumptions: First, the 
probability of getting high (expected) wages is the only motivation for labour migration. Second, 
investment in education not only increases the skill level but also increases the mobility of 
individuals and third, only skilled labours are able to migrate due to the skill-specific pull factor of 
technological change.  
Consequently, the most important novelty of this chapter consists in the fact that in an 
Acemoglu (2002) type growth model we explicitly integrate the model of the human capital 
accumulation by taking into account the possibility of skilled-biased migration. The results support 
the positive impact of SBTC on human capital accumulation in less developed countries due to the 
existence of the possibility of migration. Both skilled and less skilled parents increase their 
investment in education for their children in spite of that SBTC has not occurred in their countries. 
This result shows that an SBTC in an advanced economy stimulates the investment in education in 
less developed country, as long as the probability of getting high wages via migration is sufficiently 
high. At the same time, the present chapter has figured out that the net effect of SBTC on human 
capital accumulation is ambiguous (either positive or negative or neutral) for advanced countries 
under skilled migration. This result depends on the two opposite effects: First, a higher current 
wage ratio due to SBTC leads to a higher relative education cost for less skilled parents. This 
implies a negative effect on human capital accumulation. Second, the probability of earning skilled 
wages in the future, keeps the parents from investing in higher levels of education. The approach we 
follow in this study does not bring any negative externalities of skilled migration on the decisions of 
investment in education of local parents at advanced countries under the implications of SBTC.  
Chapter 3 is a joint paper with Professor Alberto Bucci. We analyze the impact of 
population growth as an exogenous variable on economic growth under endogenous technological 
change with human capital accumulation. This chapter is composed of two parts. In the first part of 
the paper, we set up a theoretical model with expanding variety of products and endogenous human 
capital formation. In the second part, the theoretical results are tried to test through a system of 
simultaneous equations by employing a panel fixed effect and structural panel VAR analyses for a 
set of countries. 
 The novelty of this study is the inclusion of a dilution effect of population growth which is 
not presented in the original Uzawa-Lucas model of human capital accumulation. Unlike Lucas 
(1988), we illustrate that population growth has a direct and negative effect which decreases human 
capital investment of economic agents, and thus economic growth. Additionally the paper explains 
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the population growth may have an opposite effect on economic growth which is called indirect 
ideas effect of population growth.  
The main objectives of this paper are first to provide an alternative but complementary 
theoretical framework explaining why an increase in the population growth rate may yield an 
ambiguous (positive, negative or neutral) impact on the growth rate of per-capita income in the very 
long-run, and second, given this ambiguity, to assess exactly to what extent the dilution effect of 
population growth may affect countries’ economic growth differently. The theoretical results have 
demonstrated (i) dilution effect has a central role in explaining the ambiguous sign of the impact of 
population growth on economic growth along the BGP equilibrium. (ii) A threshold level for the 
dilution effect exists. (iii) Correlation between population and economic growth rates may be either, 
positive or negative or else neutral as long as the dilution effect is greater than one. (iv) There exists 
an unambiguously positive correlation between population growth and economic growth as long as 
the dilution effect is sufficiently low (below one). Empirical results also have supported the later 
finding that a dilution effect of population growth on human capital accumulation exists and is 
below the threshold level in advanced economies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND MIGRATION: A REVIEW 
  
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper is a survey article that mainly reviews the literatures of international 
migration and economic growth. Over the last fifteen years there has been a growing concern about 
the effects of migration on human capital formation. The main motivation of the present article is to 
identify how and to what extent migration affects human capital accumulation, and thus, economic 
growth. The paper reveals that the research on migration requires a multi-dimensional perspective 
in explaining the human capital related economic questions. The paper shows that that the impact 
of migration on human capital accumulation can be observed via three channels: The impacts of 
migration on (i) skill formation, (ii) fertility decisions and (iii) wage (income) levels. This review 
addresses that the changes in those factors generally drive many of the differences in results (either 
positive or negative or neutral) across studies. Lastly, this review figures out that endogenous 
growth models do not take the impacts of different skill and durations of migration into account 
sufficiently, and the current theoretical results need to be verified by further empirical researches.  
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1. Introduction 
The literature on migration is one of the most extensive in economics. Even though there are 
many reasons such as ageing population, demographic decline, global competition and other 
economic and political factors making this topic so interesting, the most popular topic have been 
questioned in the literature is whether immigrants lead to an adverse effect on labor market 
outcomes or not. Contrary to the popular belief, recent studies show that immigrants have positive 
effects on productivity, income and wage inequality. Currently we can say that international labor 
movements have several economic implications lead to ambiguity in results. In this survey we 
confine ourselves to figure out the impacts of migration on human capital accumulation. Therefore, 
this paper is largely associated with two literatures: international migration, and economic growth. 
Many factors (technological change, income distribution, trade-offs between work and 
fertility, public policies and education) have become subjects to research for their effects on human 
capital accumulation. As we know that human capital is one of the most vital factors for production 
because of its significant roles in economic activity. First, it makes a direct contribution to 
production with physical capital. Second, stock of human capital is essential to sustain 
technological progress and innovation, which are substantial for economic growth. Therefore, 
human capital accumulation is directly linked to output growth, and these two reasons sufficiently 
explain why the studies on human capital accumulation take an important place in the endogenous 
growth literature. Given this, the present survey attempts to find an instructive answer to the 
following question: How and to what extent does migration affect human capital accumulation and 
thus, economic growth? This study also aims to identify the knowledge gaps in this field to make 
some suggestions for future researches.  
The paper reveals that mainly three channels drive many of the differences in results across 
studies focusing on the impacts of migration on human capital accumulation. These channels can be 
categorized as follows: (i) skill formation, (ii) fertility decisions and (iii) wage (income) 
differentiation. This survey also concludes that in growth literature, the effects of return migration 
on human capital accumulation is not sufficiently discussed
1
, and expanding the empirical analyses 
by considering the diversity in various types of migration may also be an important contribution to 
the literature.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the main 
implications of migration on human capital accumulation briefly. Sections 3 and 4 detail the basic 
                                                          
1
 Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) point out the positive role of return migration to origin countries via the 
additional skills acquired abroad.  
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structures of the studies with regard to home and host country analyses respectively. Section 5 
explains the differences in findings with a summary of the results. Finally, section 6 concludes the 
review. 
2. Migration and Its Implications on Human Capital Accumulation 
The linkage between migration and human capital accumulation has two major dimensions 
(implications in the country of destination and in the origin country) which can also be categorized 
by means of the duration (temporary vs. permanent) and the heterogeneity in skill types (low vs. 
high-skilled) of migration. With regard to human capital accumulation issue there are several 
questions to be answered: For instance, to what extent is a brain drain good for home countries? 
What are the human capital externalities of migration on non-migrants, and which impacts of 
migration on natives have already been observed? What is the net human capital stock after 
migration flows in receiving countries? Does high-skilled immigration absolutely raise the 
accumulation of skills in those countries in the long run? or do low-skilled migrants affect human 
capital formation negatively?      
As Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997, 1998), Vidal (1998) and Stark and Wang (2002) 
argued, the migration prospects may bring an incentive to accumulate skills, and make a 
contribution to human capital formation in less developed countries. Or as recent studies Maria and 
Stryszowski (2009), Magris and Russo (2009), Maria and Lazarova (2011), Azarnert (2011) 
showed, migration and selective immigration policies may distort the agent’s incentives to 
accumulate the most appropriate skills
2
 for their country of origin. These are some of the findings at 
the forefront of policy making debates which require a multi-dimensional perspective in explaining 
the human capital related economic discussions. 
Empirical evidences suggest that the impacts of migration on labor market outcomes is one 
of the controversial topics in the literature at present
3
, and it is clear that the effects of migration on 
human capital investment of natives depends on how the expectations have been defined by the 
theoretical models. For instance, if there is a strong belief that the impact of migration on native 
wages is negative, this would result, ceteris-paribus, a negative effect on optimal education 
decisions of natives in receiving countries. However, Docquier et al. (2010) find that immigration 
has zero to small positive long-run effect on the average wages of natives in the rich OECD 
                                                          
2
  Skills are generally classified as lower and higher-skills. In addition to this classification, higher-skills can also be 
categorized in two groups according to their specializations: “technical and general skills”. 
3
  Some references on this literature can be found, see Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Peri 
(2006). On the contrary, see Borjas (2005). 
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countries and reduces the wage inequality among the workers. It is likely to find a number of 
studies showing positive impacts of migration on optimal education decision of natives. This 
literature argues that high-skilled immigration exerts a positive effect on the return of investment in 
higher education among natives. Like Regets (2001), Bellettini and Ceroni (2003) show that 
opening up the borders to the immigrants brings an upward shift in the steady-state fraction of 
skilled native workers as long as the host economy succeeds in attracting high skilled foreign 
agents. As Chander and Thangavelu (2004) emphasize that due to the policy interactions between 
education and migration, and complementarities in technological development some governments 
may prefer to stimulate high-skilled migrants to move into their countries as an alternative policy 
tool. Conversely, in an early study (Van Dalen, 1993) receiving countries are advised to train their 
own labor force instead of introducing a selective immigration policy due to widening of the 
divergence in dynamic efficiency in capital accumulation. Contrary to Regets (2001), Borjas (2007, 
2009), Azarnert (2010a, 2010b) also emphasize immigration induced adverse effects on educational 
incentives for native population.  
The relation between technological progress and brain drain is the other controversial issue 
in economics. We know that brain drain can be simply defined as the emigration of high-skilled 
brains from one country to another, and here, skilled-biased technological change is a pull factor on 
these flows. However, technological progress may not always favor the skilled workers, and this 
point is often overlooked in the analyses. Funk and Vogel (2004) deal with this question, and show 
that technological progress can also increase the efficiency of unskilled workers. In other words, 
many developed countries at the same time attract the unskilled foreign workers. Therefore; taking 
solely skilled migration into consideration on the analyses of human capital accumulation may not 
always reflect what is likely to happen in the receiving countries at the present time. Very few 
theoretical studies such as Cipriani (2006), and Azarnert (2011) draw attention to this point. 
It is interesting to note that Sato et al. (2008) explain how an skill biased technological 
change plays a role in explaining the key stylized facts of economic development. Increases in the 
fraction of educated people, and declines in the fertility, and rises followed by declines in income 
inequality is the simple explanation of this cycle. Like the relationship between fertility and 
technological change, there is also a large literature on the relationship between fertility and 
migration addressing the potential impacts of migration on native population.
4
 The studies focusing 
on the implications of low-skilled immigration on host countries argue that this type of migration 
                                                          
4
  Particularly relevant for Europe, where fertility rates are low, and population is ageing. 
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may increase the labor supply of high-skilled native women and may reduce the trade-off between 
work and fertility among high skilled workers.
5
 
Fertility decisions are also crucial in explaining the human capital accumulation. Parents are 
free to choose the number of children they want to raise. The ultimate aim for them is to provide a 
necessary education, which will provide a sufficient economic condition to their children during the 
life time. Investing in education of the same proportion with a high fertility rate is understandably 
more costly than investing with a low fertility rate. In general, much of the relevant studies raise the 
following question: How does migration affect the fertility decisions of parents, and thus, the 
human capital accumulation in source and receiving countries via fertility? Chen (2006, 2009) show 
that change in the migration probability leads to a trade-off between the quality and the quantity of 
children. As a result of this trade-off, not only fertility and education decisions but also economic 
growths of source countries are affected. Marchiori et al. (2008) and Zak et al. (2002) also analyze 
the impact of migration on the dynamics of the distribution of human capital via fertility. As recent 
studies Azarnert (2010b, 2011) and Mountford and Rapoport (2011) are the influential ones for the 
theoretical analysis.  
After having looked at the literature, we now conclude this section by underlining that the 
results are responsive to the model assumptions and the channels mentioned in the studies. The 
following two sections; section three and four discuss the studies with regard to home and host 
country analyses, respectively.  
3. Human Capital Accumulation in Home Country Analyses  
Home country -or origin country- analyses focus on the economic effects of migration on 
migrant sending countries. It is important to highlight Regets (2001)’s statement here that 
“receiving” and “sending” are not meant be equal to “developed” and “less developed”. Today 
retaining human capital has become a challenging issue for many developed countries as a result of 
global competition. Many less developed countries are also successful to attract foreign talents in 
areas where they are able to offer opportunities. Indeed, many countries may be both net receivers 
and net senders in different skill areas. However in the migration literature migrant sending 
countries are often defined as small economies and the wage efficiency unit of labor in these 
countries is always lower than that in the world economies. Due to the smallness of their 
economies, they are reasonably open to push and pull factors, which lead people to leave their 
countries.   
                                                          
5
  For the literature, see Furtado and Hock (2010).  
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Talking about the effects of emigration on human capital accumulation at any research or 
policy debate, the attention tends to focus on two major topics: “brain drain and brain gain”. The 
brain drain issue is not a new phenomenon in the literature, and studies date back to late 60s such as 
Grubel and Scott (1966), Johnson (1967). The primary emphasis on the importance of skilled 
human capital for economic growth has led Miyagiwa (1991), Burda and Wyplosz (1992), Haque 
and Kim (1995) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997) to presume that a brain drain has detrimental effects 
on economic development of low income countries. However, with the late 90s the migration 
literature including Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997, 1998), Vidal (1998) and Stark and Wang 
(2002) has evolved to beneficial brain drain economics for home countries.
6
  
Table 1. Brain Drain vs. Brain Gain: Historical Evolution of Brain Drain Studies 
 
Classification of  Brain Drain Literature Relevant References 
 
Classical Brain Drain Studies 
[late 60s – late 90s] 
 
Grubel and Scott (1966), Johnson (1967),  Miyagiwa 
(1991), Burda and Wyplosz (1992), Haque and Kim 
(1995), Galor and Tsiddon (1997) 
 
Beneficial Brain Drain Studies 
[late 90s – 2000s] 
Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997, 1998), Vidal 
(1998), Stark and Wang (2002),  Chen (2006, 2009), 
Marchiori et al. (2008)  Sorger et al. (2013),  Stark and 
Dorn (2013) 
 
Empirical Studies Beine et al. (2001, 2008),  Maria and Lazarova (2011) 
 
As a consequence of the absence of reliable data on international migration by educational 
attainment, the discussions on brain drain have long remained purely theoretical in the literature. 
Over the last decade, a few empirical analyses such as Maria and Lazarova (2011), Beine et al. 
(2001, 2008) have attempted to test these theoretical predictions of new brain drain economics. 
3.1 The Main Channels 
3.1.1  Educational Incentives under Probabilistic Migration Models  
Using overlapping generations (OLG) models Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997, 1998), 
Vidal (1998) has theorized the mechanism of how emigration affects the human capital formation in 
migrant sending countries. The main assumptions are as the following: Education decisions are 
endogenous, human capital is acquired instantly in home country, and wages are independent from 
migration. The later implies that the effects of migration on labor market outcomes are neglected in 
explaining the human capital formation mechanism in those countries. This approach depends on 
                                                          
6
  For an extensive overview about emigration, brain drain and development issue; see Docquier and Rapoport (2012), 
Clemens (2011), and Gibson and McKenzie (2011). 
13 
 
workers’ possibilities of enjoying higher wages from rich countries through migration. In short, 
higher returns to skill in a foreign country increase the migration prospects and incentives to invest 
in education at home. If we reconsider the overlapping generation frameworks of Stark et al. (1997, 
1998) the saving option has not been placed in their settings. Savings may lead to weaken the 
decisions of making additional investment in education. Latest study, Stark and Dorn (2013) 
therefore examine whether saving crowds out the effect of the prospect of migration on human 
capital formation. The authors show that even agents have the option to save the possibility of 
migration raises the human capital acquired by workers in developing countries. 
Mountford (1997) shows that when the productivity of home country economy is an 
increasing function of the proportion of educated people in the previous time, and the probability of 
successful emigration is not a certainty  0 1p  , general emigration increases the human capital 
accumulation, and is unambiguously good for home countries. Additionally, another point is also 
emphasized by Mountford: As a result of multiple steady-state levels of human capital 
accumulation, as long as emigration is permitted for agents who have a certain level of ability, brain 
drain migration increases the amount of educated agents higher than the general emigration does. 
This finding shows that a source economy can benefit from a brain drain under certain conditions 
(such as high wage differences among countries and low proportion of educated people in the 
previous period with a small prospect of emigration) which present a positive level of emigration; 
otherwise, a brain drain will have negative effects. Vidal (1998) also merely rests on the model of 
Mountford (1997). The author points out that the higher the probability of emigration the higher the 
level of human capital formation. But due to the presence of multiple steady-states, the opening the 
economy to labor emigration does not always imply a convergence to the highest possible level of 
human capital accumulation. In order to guarantee the convergence to upper level of human capital, 
the probability of emigration must be high enough. In the words of Stark and Wang: “What 
migration can entail is that the gains from migration to the home country accrue neither from 
migrant’s remittances nor from migrants’ return home with amplified skills acquired abroad” 
(2002, p. 30). The main idea of Stark and Wang (2002) is that higher prospective returns to human 
capital in a developed country stimulate more human capital formation in a developing country via 
migration, and therefore, migration can also be considered as a substitute for the provision of public 
subsidies as a means of bringing about the formation of a socially preferred level of human capital. 
Complementing Stark and Wang (2002), Sorger et al. (2013) show that human capital gain confers 
a long-run growth and a welfare gain in the home country beyond some threshold level of human 
capital. 
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Another fact is that the duration of stays of emigrant workers in a foreign country is either 
permanent or temporary. However, in the new brain drain literature it is a common assumption that 
emigration is given permanent. Stark et al. (1997) explain the human capital formation in home 
countries by highlighting this point and reproduce the framework by introducing the return 
migration as a new step which follows the phases of acquiring human capital in home country and 
emigration.
7
 Unlike Mountford (1997), the authors consider a successful emigration case where the 
probabilistic migration rate is given, and unity throughout the model. Additionally, Stark et al. 
(1997) assume that the human capital acquired in home country cannot be equally efficient for all 
educated emigrant workers in host economies, and may not be fully distinguished by the employers 
due to the asymmetric information  m . As a consequence of this asymmetry, relatively low-skilled 
workers may enjoy a high wages in pre-discovery period but a lower wage following discovery 
when the asymmetry is abated  0 1m  . If this new condition (the probability of discovering true 
productivity levels of migrants) makes staying abroad costly rather than living in home country, the 
emigrant workers will find it convenient to return their home countries. Therefore it makes a 
contribution to the human capital accumulation in home countries through a return migration of 
relatively low skilled educated workers. Stark et al. (1997) figure out that the higher probability of 
perfect information  m  in the second period, higher the permanent migration of high skill workers, 
but the opposite holds for low skilled workers.   
People are not identical in abilities. Unless there is a unique education system in the home 
country, the cost of acquiring human capital for talent and less talent individuals differ. We can say 
that the cost of education is decreasing in personal ability, and the correlation between the 
probability of emigration and the average level of human capital is positive. However, in general 
the probability of emigration is given exogenous in theoretical models. Individuals with a low 
average level of human capital should require a lower probability than those with a high average 
level of human capital. Vidal (1998) amends the basic model to endogenise the probability of 
emigration:  
 
#*
#*
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t
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if h hp
p h
if h hp p
 
 
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7
  Dustman et al. (2011) highlight that efficiency considerations, which has been largely overlooked in the literature, 
determine who leaves and who returns. Emigration and return migration decisions mostly depend on the extent of 
transferability of working and schooling experiences acquired in one country to another one. Therefore, wage 
differentials are not only motive behind the emigration decisions. A person may move to a country to acquire high-
skills, and then may come back if the return to human capital is high in the origin country. 
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In Vidal’s demonstration the probability of emigration is a function of human capital level that the 
presence of a threshold externality  #h  affects the convergence patterns. It is interesting to note 
that even though emigration is a basic human right which is established by the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is often restricted by the governments, and is regulated by 
the national laws of destination countries. Magris and Russo (2009) also define an endogenous 
probability by introducing the weight of immigration policies ( ) on the entries of emigrants to 
destination countries.  
       , 1p h h                0,1   
The crucial thing under Magris and Russo (2009)’s framework is that selective immigration policies 
either foster or harm the equilibrium level of human capital under the case of restricted entry. In 
their analysis, they obtain some conditions that make returns to education uncertain, and they argue 
that selective policies may harm incentives to invest in human capital. For instance the analysis by 
Bertoli et al. (2014) reveals that there is an optimal degree of selectivity in immigration policies 
when migrants are positively selected on unobservable abilities, and that further increases in 
selectivity have detrimental effects on migrants’ quality. 
To the best of our knowledge, Beine et al. (2001) is the first attempt providing an empirical 
validation of the conditions of a positive brain drain in home countries. They test the direct effect of 
emigration on education and its indirect effect on growth by using cross-section data including 37 
developing countries. The results show that the possibility of brain gain in theoretical analyses 
cannot be rejected on the base of available data.
8
 Following this study, with a new data set for 127 
developing countries, the authors find an evidence of a positive effect of skilled migration prospects 
on gross human capital levels at pre-migration period in home countries. The empirical evidence 
suggest that countries combining relatively low levels of human capital and low rates for skilled 
emigration are more likely to experience a beneficial brain drain, however this hypothesis is 
supported only for a small group of countries in Beine et al. (2008). Beine et al. (2001, 2008) have 
theoretically figured out two fundamental results: First, there is a positive non-linear relation 
between migration opportunities and education. Second, the growth rate is positively linked to share 
of educated people, and is negatively affected by migration of these educated agents.  
The question of why the brain gain has been observed in a small number of countries draws 
Maria and Stryszowski (2009)’s attention. They focus on the existence of winners and losers among 
                                                          
8
  Beine et al. (2008) reemphasize that in the absence of reliable data on international migration by educational level, the 
discussions on the impacts of brain drain for home countries have long remained purely theoretical in the literature. For 
empirical estimations, the following sources can be used: Beine et al. (2007), Docquier and Marfouk (2006).   
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sending countries. If we look at the brain gain literature, the common point of the previous studies 
is the assumption of an equal benefit from all human capital in fostering the productivity growth in 
home countries. However, Maria and Stryszowski (2009) underline that the improvement in 
productivity relies on the composition of human capital in each country, and migration may distort 
the agents’ incentives to accumulate the most appropriate skills, and therefore changes the 
composition of human capital in origin countries.
9
 The authors argue that in early stages of 
development, specialization in technical skills may be helpful, but at later stages (such as innovative 
phases of development), a broader range of skills such as financial, managerial, legal and political 
have important contribution on productivity. Skill allocation is crucial for developing world and is 
influenced by the prospects of migration.
10
 The gap between technological frontier and actual level 
of productivity is an important determinant for the gain in those countries under migration. As a 
consequence of the change in the composition of human capital, educational incentives may have 
detrimental effects on the growth of origin countries. In other words, the more gap between 
technological frontier and actual level the stronger the negative effects of migration on growth. For 
instance, Maria and Lazarova (2011) explicitly reveal that the level effect of  migration on the stock 
of  human capital and the composition effect on skills that agents choose to acquire (general or 
technical) depend on technological development of sending countries. Maria and Lazarova 
concludes this evidence: “…Differences in wages and the degree of marketability of migrants’ skills 
depend on the level of technological development, thus the effect of migration needs to be discussed 
taking explicitly into account the technological gap of each sending country” (2011, p. 952). This 
finding is in line with the theoretical setting of Maria and Stryszowski (2009). 
3.1.2  Endogenous Fertility and Income Differences     
As it is observed, in probabilistic migration models have tended to assume a constant 
population growth -in every time period a new generation grows at a constant rate- and trade-offs 
between human capital accumulation (quality) and fertility (quantity) is neglected. However, in fact 
there is a quality quantity trade-off faced by parents. Investing in education of the same proportion 
with a high fertility rate is more costly than investing with a low fertility rate. It can be said that as 
long as the cost of investment in education increases, fertility decisions tend to decrease because of 
                                                          
9  
For a detailed analysis on the importance of allocation of human capital for economic growth please see Murphy, 
Shleifer and Wishny (1991). The authors argue that talents in an economy are allocated between rent seeking sectors 
(unproductive) and entrepreneurial (productive) sectors; this implies that both sectors have different effects in 
explaining the growth performance of countries. 
10  For a theoretical explanation of allocation of talents under the possibility of emigration, please see Mariani (2007). 
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the increasing schooling expenditures of the parents.
 11
 In contrast to previous literature, Chen 
(2006, 2009) and Marchiori et al. (2008) allow the fertility decisions in order to see how a change in 
the migration probability affects fertility and human capital accumulation. To the best of our 
knowledge, Chen (2006) is the first study which attempts to examine the growth differences of 
developing countries under OLG and dynamic models of migration with different type of education 
regimes and endogenous fertility. It is important to note here that, Chen in his both studies follows 
several approaches, such as discrete time OLG, stochastic partial equilibrium models and numeric 
simulations. By using OLG models, Chen (2006) shows that with endogenous fertility decisions, an 
increase in the probability of migration reduces the population growth; however, contrary to the 
expectation, fertility and school expenditures are independent from the migration probability. In the 
later study, Chen (2009) develops his model’s constraints by including the average costs in involved 
in preparing each migrating child to overcome the migration barriers (such as language skill 
preparations, paper works and so on) and figures out that both educational investment and fertility 
are dependent upon parental human capital, the extent of migration costs and the probability of 
migration.
 
The result is as the following: An increase in the migration costs and an increase in the 
probability of migration increase the educational investment while fertility reduces.    
Chen (2006)’s model and numerical simulation figure out three important results: First, in an 
economy with homogenous agents (with the same probability of migration for all agents), an 
increase in p leads to a trade-off between quality and quantity. As a result of this trade-off, fertility 
declines, school expenditures increase
12
, and thus, human capital accumulation is positively affected 
under both education regimes. Second, a brain gain can happen if there exists at least one of the 
following three conditions: (i) When the wage ratio is quite large between home and host countries 
or (ii) when parents support children to migrate or (iii) when p is sufficiently strong. Otherwise, an 
increase in p causes a brain drain in which the converse conditions hold. Relaxation of restrictions 
on high-skilled emigration contributes the economic growth unless the labor market will be 
dominated by low-skilled workers in the long run. On the other hand allowing more low-skilled 
workers to emigrate can have positive results on growth if probability of low-skilled migration is 
sufficiently high in that economy. Chen (2009) also reemphasizes the same results.  
                                                          
11
 Chen (2006) demonstrates that education regimes also affect the fertility rates in home countries. When education is 
under public regimes, the cost of having children is lower; therefore, fertility is higher under a public education regime 
than under a private education regime. 
12
 Chen explains this mechanism as the following: Having fewer children while induces parents to make more 
investment for each child’s education under private schooling, under public schooling it provides more time for adults 
to work. This means a high amount of tax revenue for governments at the same time. Therefore, school expenditure per 
student will increase due to an increase in tax revenues as well.   
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The study of Marchiori et al. (2008) differs from Chen (2006, 2009) by incorporating 
migrants’ remittances into the analyses. They assume that only high-skilled individuals can 
emigrate with a certain probability and remit. The remittances are considered as a kind of welfare 
improving element. Both skilled emigration and the prospect of remittances have effects on the 
household’s fertility and education choices in the home countries. Their main result is based on the 
following condition:  Since the marginal gain of educating one child is higher than the marginal cost 
of education parents will raise more children. This implies that migrants’ remittances play a 
significant role in explaining the human capital accumulation in home countries. Receiving more 
remittances outweighs the increased education expenditures and contributes the human capital 
accumulation. Marchiori et al. (2008) figures out two distinct effects of migration on the number of 
children. On the one hand the more probability the more remittances which leads to an increase in 
the number of high educated children, on the other hand the more probability the more educational 
cost that reduces the number of children. Therefore the effect on the number of children is 
ambiguous. General differences in approaches in the literature are summarized in Table 2, p. 18. 
It is important to note that Azarnert (2011) distinguishes itself from the literature by 
focusing only emigration of individuals from the middle class of the wealth distribution in source 
countries. As the previous studies point out that the motivation for individuals to generate 
incentives for investment in human capital is the wage differences between foreign and source 
countries but, contrary to the standard approach Azarnert shows that, the possibility of migration to 
a higher wage foreign country may lower the relative attractiveness of the skilled employment in 
the home countries. It means that low-skilled agents of home country may prefer to work in 
relatively low-skilled sectors in foreign countries and they may give up their educational 
investments for high-skilled employments in home countries.
13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 
Azarnert (2011) takes the guest-worker migration as a reference point for this study, and assumes that unskilled wages 
in foreign country are also higher than the unskilled wages in the home country. 
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Table 2. Migration induced Human Capital Accumulation effects in Home Country Analyses  
1
 Methods of Analyses : T = Theoretical; E = Empirical; N = Numerical Simulations.  
2
 Duration of Migration : P = Permanent;  R = Return Migration  
3
 Population Growth : C = Constant growth; F = Fertility induced Population Growth;  
4
 Individual Ability : HM = Homogeneous; HT= Heterogeneous Agents 
5
 Probability of Migration : E = Endogenous; X= Exogenous 
6
 Fertility  : E= Endogenous; X = Exogenous 
7 
HCA Effects via : H
 
= Higher Expected Returns; F= Fertility Effect; WI= Wage/ Income Effect 
8
 Growth Effect  : P= Positive Effect; N= Negative Effect 
 
 
References 
 
  
M
et
h
o
d
s 
o
f 
A
n
al
y
se
s 
1
 
  
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
M
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 2
 
  
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 G
ro
w
th
 3
 
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 A
b
il
it
y
 4
 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
M
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 5
 
F
er
ti
li
ty
 6
 
H
C
A
 E
ff
ec
ts
 v
ia
 7
 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 G
ro
w
th
 
E
ff
ec
t 
v
ia
  
H
C
A
 8
 
Other Variables 
P
o
si
ti
v
e 
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
n
 H
u
m
an
 C
ap
it
al
 A
cc
u
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 (
H
C
A
) 
  
 
   
  
  
Mountford (1997) T P C HT X - H P  
Stark et al. (1997) T P,R C HT X - H - Imperfect information 
Stark et al. (1998) T P C HM X - H -  
Vidal (1998) T P C HM E - H -  
Beine et al. (2001) T, E P C HT X - H P, N  
Stark and Wang (2002) T P C 
HM, 
HT 
X - H - 
The role of public subsidies 
on HCA. 
Dos Santos and Postel-
Vinay (2003) 
T, N P, R C HM X - H P 
Positive effect of 
knowledge diffusion. 
Chen (2006) T, N P F 
HM, 
HT 
X E F P, N 
Different education systems 
are considered. 
Beine et al. (2008) E, N P - HM - - H -  
Marchiori et al. (2008) T, N P F HT X E 
F,
WI 
- 
The role of remittances on 
HCA and Fertility. 
Chen ( 2009) T, N P F 
HM, 
HT 
X E 
H,
F 
P, N 
Equilibrium with migration 
costs. 
Dustman et al.  (2011) T R C HT - - 
H, 
WI 
- 
Migration decisions depend 
on efficiency 
considerations.  
Mountford and Rapoport 
(2011) 
T P F HM X E 
H, 
F 
P  
Sorger et al. (2013) T P C 
HM, 
HT 
X - H P  
Stark and Dorn (2013) T P C HM X - H - 
With a possibility of saving 
option 
          
          
D
et
ri
m
en
ta
l 
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
n
 H
C
A
 
          
Maria and Stryszowski 
(2009) 
T P C HT X - H N 
The role of the composition 
of human capital and 
technological gap. 
Magris and Russo (2009) T, N P, R C 
HM, 
HT 
E, X - H - 
 
Selective policies may 
cause a brain loss. 
 
Maria and Lazarova 
(2011) 
T, E P - HM - - H N 
Growth effect depends on 
the level of technological 
development (gap) of the 
sending country.  
Azarnert (2011)* T R F HM - E H N *Low-skilled emigration 
          
20 
 
4. Host Country Analyses 
The host or destination country analyses focus on the economic implications of migration in 
receiving countries. As previous section reveals that home country analyses assume sufficiently 
small migration flows that do not affect the wages both in receiving and in home countries. 
However, in contrast to these analyses, migration literature has mainly discussed the uncertainties 
with regard to the labor market outcomes of natives in destination countries under labor migration. 
For example, Dustmann and Preston (2006) and Borjas (2007, 2009) generally emphasize the 
reductions in economic opportunities of natives.   
The main issue is therefore to understand to what extent the skills are interchangeable and 
transferable among natives and immigrants. In other words, substitutability within occupational 
skill levels, and complementarities between natives and immigrants have become a long standing 
concern of economists. Regarding this discussion Regets (2001) underlines the asymmetries in 
arguments for the sake of simplicities. Regets explains his statement in the context of static supply 
and demand equilibrium with the following example: “If high-skilled immigrants are substitute for 
natives in the domestic labor market, it would lead a reduction in the human capital investment 
return for natives (wages) due to the increase in the supply of higher-skills in the domestic labor 
market. Then, return of human capital would reduce the incentives for natives in human capital. If 
we take the lower-skilled immigrants as substitutes for lower-skilled natives and as complements 
the higher-skilled natives, this would increase the inequality between higher-skilled and lower-
skilled workers. However, if we consider both propositions at the same time, the following 
argument would be also possible: While lower-skilled migrants would increase the incentives for 
natives to invest in human capital, the high-skilled immigrants reduce the inequality” (2001, p. 15). 
The literature on host country analyses shows that human capital level of natives is generally 
affected by two main groups of factors which can be called as internal and external factors. Internal 
factors which are composed of political and economic conditions (such as physical and human 
capital stocks, the distribution of human capital and fertility choices, technological environments) 
are important in defining the education decisions of natives. It is clear that immigration belongs to 
external factors that also have effects on these internal factors. As Chiswick (1989) states that the 
implications of immigration depends on the immigrants’ size and quality.    
In general, much of the relevant studies ask the following question: How and in which forms 
do immigrants affect the incentives for investment of natives? Chander and Thangavelu (2004) 
emphasize the importance of attracting high skilled migrants for educational attainment of natives 
as natural consequences of interaction between education and immigration policies, and 
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complementarities between technology and education. Authors demonstrate that higher level of 
investment in education increases returns from the new technology relative to the old, and 
entrepreneurs may indeed adopt the new technology when workers invest more in education. 
Conversely, low investment in education may indeed lead entrepreneurs to decide not to switch to 
the new technology. From a welfare point of view, governments can coordinate the expectations of 
workers and entrepreneurs’ decisions on adoption of the new technologies. If governments commit 
themselves to attract high-skilled immigrant workers then natives will also increase their investment 
in education and the economy will move from low technology equilibrium to welfare improving 
technology.
14
 
Bellettini and Ceroni (2003) show that instead of increasing the barriers, reducing the 
restrictions to foreign workers may be beneficial to generate positive spillover effects on natives’ 
incentives to invest in education. Their OLG dynamic model reveals that opening up the borders to 
immigrants brings an upward shift in the steady-state fraction of skilled natives when the host 
economy succeeds in attracting the skilled foreign agents sufficiently. Below a threshold level of 
the immigration quota, the steady-state fraction of skilled natives is lower than in the closed 
economy. In order to characterize the migration incentives of skilled and unskilled agents Bellettini 
and Ceroni define some threshold values of unit wages for domestic labor market. Under certain 
assumptions
15
 they show that a minimum wage, which is compatible with immigration, stimulates 
only skilled immigrants to enter into domestic labor markets. This leads a direct brain gain which is 
determined by the level of restrictions in host countries, and by the average human capital level of 
immigrants. The reason of an increase in educational incentives for natives in Bellettini and Ceroni 
(2003) relies on the reduction in individual costs of acquiring education through an increase in 
average level of human capital by skilled migration. While skilled immigrants increase the average 
level of human capital in host countries, at the meantime they reduce the threshold levels of ability 
that makes the schooling decisions preferable by natives.
16
 However, some studies argue that 
immigration policies may not be as effective as expected. In a former study, (Van Dalen, 1993) 
receiving countries are advised to train their own labor force instead of introducing selective 
immigration policies due to widening of the divergence in dynamic efficiency in capital 
accumulation. 
                                                          
14
  Like Maria and Stryszowski (2009), Chander and Thangavelu (2004) also use two forms of human capital such as 
“general” and “technology-specific”. 
15  
Immigration is temporary and costly. In particularly, subjective costs are independent of skills of foreign agents. 
Total costs of migration are higher for the unskilled individuals, and a perfect substitutability of skilled and unskilled 
labor exists in production.  
16  
Belletini and Ceroni (2003) also define the threshold levels of abilities for skilled and unskilled parents’ children in 
order to clarify the education decisions of parents. 
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The study of Zak et al. (2002) is one of the seminal works which analyzes the impact of 
immigration on the dynamics of the distribution of human capital in receiving countries when 
fertility and migration decisions are endogenous. In an open-economy endogenous growth model 
with heterogeneity in skills, they show that fertility and immigration can cause an economy to be 
caught in a poverty trap, but under specified conditions may also lead to a balanced growth. In Zak 
et al. (2002), the depreciation of human capital, the cost of emigration and the preferences for 
children have significant effects in explaining the impacts of immigration on human capital 
accumulation of natives. The authors argue that when immigrants and natives are identical
17
, 
economies with strong political capacity and sufficient initial stocks of physical and human capital 
are attracted to the balanced growth path (BGP), and a constant level of immigration has no effect 
on the dynamics of balanced growth but affects the rate of convergence to the BGP. On the other 
hand, their model analytically shows that as long as the immigrants’ human capital less than the 
native workers, it leads a negative impact on growth because of the higher fertility rate of 
immigrants that reduces the rate of accumulation of human capital.  Zak et al. (2002) reveals that if 
human capital depreciates upon emigration and the preference for children is higher than the 
destination country, immigrants save less and have more children than natives, therefore; this leads 
an inequality reducing growth via fertility.  
As we know that, agents want to maximize their utilities in their life times and they do make 
their migration decisions by taking the expected benefits of migration into consideration under 
certain constraints such as budget, education and migration costs. Indeed in Zak et al. (2002), the 
moving cost has an important role in explaining and structuring the the model however, it is given 
exogenously. Like Zak et al. (2002), Cipriani (2006) also analyzes the effects of immigration on 
growth where the source of growth is human capital accumulation under endogenous fertility. 
Cipriani (2006)’s work distinguishes itself from the rest of the analyses by taking the various type 
of migration (skilled-unskilled, temporary-permanent) into account. Contrary to Zak et al. (2002), 
Cipriani assumes that migration cost is a proportion of the level of human capital and inversely 
related to immigrants’ ability. This endogeneity implies that the more skilled agents can adjust to 
the new environment with less cost.           
Mountford and Rapoport (2011) show the linkage between equilibrium level of ability and 
human capital accumulation in a dynamic two country model of the world economy where agents in 
both countries make optimal fertility and human capital decisions. Like Maria and Stryszowski 
                                                          
17  
Zak et al. (2002) assume here a benchmark model which considers a case when there is no immigration cost. Natives 
and immigrants have the same level of human capital and human capital does not depreciate when moving from a 
country to another. 
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(2009) and Maria and Lazarova (2011), Mountford and Rapoport (2011) also argue that an increase 
in growth of frontier technology in a receiving economy with no migration increases the 
equilibrium level of human capital via decreases in the threshold level of ability for natives to 
become an educated person, and decreases the fertility rates. By opening the economy to the skilled 
immigrants, their result shows two distinct effects, namely static and dynamic effect. The first 
defines an increase in fertility and a reduction in the proportion of native agents becoming skilled 
because of an increase in the threshold level of ability and a decrease in the equilibrium of skilled 
workers. The second effect shows that even a permanent immigration of a small amount of skilled 
foreign workers leads an increase in the equilibrium growth rate of economy because of an increase 
in the equilibrium level of human capital, and therefore; a positive effect on human capital 
accumulation and a negative effect on fertility occur in receiving country. The net effect of skilled 
immigration on human capital accumulation depends on which effect outweighs the other in the 
long run. 
On the other side, Azarnert (2010a) also mentions immigration induced adverse effects on 
educational incentives for native population. He shows that the arrival of a sizable mass of potential 
foreign workers is likely to increase the perceived probability of a possible occupational mismatch 
for skilled native individuals. This reduces the returns to human capital investment for natives. 
Again in another study Azarnert (2010b) shows that income redistribution from low-fertility natives 
to high-fertility immigrants is one of the reasons for opposition to immigration in host countries. 
Azarnert’s growth model with endogenous fertility shows that while tax-financed income transfers 
lower the fertility rate of skilled natives increases the fertility of unskilled immigrants with the 
result of a decline in human capital accumulation among natives. Addition to Azernert (2010a, 
2010b), Borjas (2007, 2009) emphasizes different point of the discussion. He indicates that skilled 
foreign students in advanced education also adversely affect the educational attainments of natives 
in those areas, and crowd out them from several high-skilled fields in the US.  
In short, the review shows that different approaches lead to differences in results across 
studies. The following section explains the differences in findings with a summary of the 
implications of migration on economic growth via human capital accumulation. 
5. How do results affect economic growth? 
Until now we have categorized the main channels identifying the interactions between 
migration and human capital accumulation in home and host country analyses.  In this section, we 
will sum up the main factors - such as assumptions, parameters, variables or analytical frameworks 
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- that have critical roles in explaining the differences in results. Listed below, accompanied by a 
synopsis of supporting explanations, are several points that determine the results in the 
abovementioned studies. 
1. An optimized emigration policy can play an important role in increasing the growth rate of the 
home country. It is crucial to reemphasize here that the human capital level of a country is one of 
the determinants of the productivity level of an economy; thus, the impact of migration on 
economic growth can merely be investigated via its impact on human capital accumulation. In this 
review, we have figured out that many theoretical models use OLG framework in explaining the 
optimality conditions of individuals, and it is more likely to see multiple steady-state levels of 
human capital accumulation. The possibility of multiple steady-state equilibrium is one of the 
interesting features of OLG approaches that only high-skilled emigration guarantees the high 
education levels under certain conditions.  
2. Uncertainty and different migration probabilities are the key assumptions that determine the 
impacts of migration on human capital accumulation. In the absence of restriction on labor mobility
 1p  , both general and high-skilled migrations affect human capital formation negatively. 
Without taking the return migration into account, the intuition behind the uncertainty is quite 
obvious. Otherwise, every individual who invest in education leaves their country due to the certain 
employment opportunities in host countries. As a result of this, an economy with differentiated 
abilities arises the necessity of using endogenous probability of migration in order to pursue more 
realistic results in economic models. 
3. Trade-off between quality and quantity of children matters under changes in migration 
probabilities since the economic growth depends on the human capital. The studies show that 
fertility in general decreases with education, and an increase in investment in human capital also 
leads an increase in the probability of emigration. Thus, the fertility differentials between natives 
and immigrants matters because of the effect on the average level of human capital at both sending 
and receiving countries.  
4. The distance from technological frontier plays a major role in determining the effects of 
migration on growth via distribution of skill types. Recent studies such as Maria and Stryszowski 
(2009) and Maria and Lazarova (2011) point out that the probability of migration has two main 
effects on human capital accumulation: “level effect” and “composition effect”. While the first one 
positively affects the shared of skilled workers in the home country, the second one affects the 
proportion of technical skills either positive or negative according to the development stage of a 
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country. If an economy is far from the technological frontier, the sign of the composition effects 
would be negative, and the level effect would be high. However migration induced changes may 
distort the agents’ incentives to accumulate the most appropriate skills for the country of origin. 
This implies that although there is an increase in human capital accumulation in home country, the 
composition of the workforce induced by the probability of migration may lead to detrimental 
effects on growth. 
6. Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper is to show “how international migration affects human 
capital accumulation in both the sending and receiving countries”.  This paper is mainly based on 
two strands of literature. First, it is related to the literature on international migration including the 
papers that analyzing the impacts of migration on economic growth and second, it is related to the 
papers that analyze the human capital accumulation under endogenous growth models. This review 
shows that the relationship between migration and human capital accumulation requires a multi-
dimensional perspective including many aspects and types of migration. The present paper reveals 
that migration affects the human capital accumulation via its effects on three important factors: (i) 
Skill formation, (ii) fertility decisions and (iii) wage (income) levels. This review has showed that 
changes in these factors drive many of the differences in results across studies. Moreover, this paper 
point outs that the ambiguity in results mainly depends on the modeling structure and the 
assumptions.  
This review also identifies the knowledge gaps in this field by assessing the existing studies 
under the light of evidential facts. As one can observe that under certain conditions, the brain drain 
migration theoretically can lead to positive effects for home countries, and can dominate its 
negative effects. Even though the absence of reliable data on high-skilled migration, a limited 
number of empirical studies supports the theoretical results of the beneficial brain drain analyses. 
This review reveals that further empirical research (e.g. panel data analyses over longer time 
periods) is strongly needed to verify current theoretical results. 
This paper demonstrates that the interaction between education and immigration policies 
may also be considered as a new research topic in policy analyses on the sustainability of economic 
growth. For instance, the overlapping generation models have showed that optimal migration 
policies can succeed in increasing the steady-state level of human capital in both the sending and 
receiving countries. At the policy level, this result suggests that migration of high skilled agents can 
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also be considered as a policy instrument which may substitute the income related public subsidies 
in home and host countries. 
Lastly, this review concludes that the impacts of permanent migration on human capital 
accumulation and growth have been widely studied in the literature. However, further attention to 
studies on temporary migration is needed. From a methodological point of view, the impact of the 
return migration on human capital accumulation, and thus growth would be an interesting extension 
for future empirical studies. Furthermore, like permanent migration, taking only skilled migration 
into considerations may not always reflect what is likely to happen in receiving countries at the 
present time. Analyses allowing and combining all types of migration (skilled-unskilled, 
permanent-temporary) may provide a robust estimation on the impacts of increased heterogeneity in 
populations.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION UNDER SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE WITH MIGRATION  
  
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The impact of migration on human capital accumulation has become one of the most 
important aspects of economic growth. By introducing the human capital accumulation and 
migration to an Acemoglu-type growth model this paper provides a complementary dimension to 
the directed technological change literature. The motivation behind this paper is the lack of 
economic analyses on how skill-biased technological change (SBTC) affects the human capital 
accumulation in both sending and receiving countries; therefore the paper attempts to answer a 
new question: How does a SBTC affect human capital accumulation in developed and less 
developed countries undergoing skill-biased migration? The main results show that, while a SBTC 
in a technologically advanced country has positive effects on human capital accumulation in 
technologically less developed countries via migration, it may adversely affect the incentives of 
local (natives) low skilled individuals to invest in education at advanced countries. Therefore, the 
net effect of SBTC is ambiguous (either positive or negative or neutral) in developed countries 
under migration. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper builds upon the skill-biased technological change (hereafter SBTC) literature 
developed by Acemoglu (2002) to provide a “complementary dimension” between the studies of 
human capital accumulation and migration by using a theoretical framework. The motivation 
behind this work is the lack of economic analyses on how SBTC affects human capital 
accumulation in both migrant sending and receiving countries in an Acemoglu-type growth model.  
Factor endowments -as a force shaping technological change- play an essential role in the 
economic development. The scarcity of high qualified persons, inappropriate domestic policies and 
mismatches between technologies and resources increase productivity differences between the rich 
and poor countries.
118
Lack of well functioning markets, low employment rates, increasing costs of 
technological adoption and insufficient investment in R&D are some factors that push the human 
capital of less developed countries to search for jobs in advanced economies. As Acemoglu (1998, 
2002) shows, technological change favors high skilled labor, and increases the labor demand. Such 
an increase in demand for skilled labor which is mostly driven by SBTC leads to an increase in 
skill-specific migration (brain drain) from less developed countries to technologically advanced 
countries as well. 
Acemoglu (1998) emphasizes that profit incentives determine the amount of research and 
development directed towards different factors and sectors. The main determinants for these 
incentives are relative prices and market sizes. Similarly for human capital, wage incentives 
determine the level of investment in education for acquiring appropriate skills before entering the 
labor market. Beine et al. (2001) have addressed this issue and show that increasing the possibility 
to work abroad increases the stock of human capital in the source countries. Therefore, we can infer 
that, the underlying reason for the migration of skilled labors is the probability of getting high 
wages accompanied by a well functioning technological environment.
219
  
This paper aims to bring a new perspective to the economic literature by asking the 
following question: How does an SBTC affect human capital formation in less developed and 
developed countries under skill-biased migration? One important novelty of the present paper is that 
this study introduces migration to the Acemoglu (2002) model of skill-biased technological change 
to see how this affects the predictions on relative wages and human capital accumulation in both 
sending and receiving countries. Consequently, this paper makes a contribution to the literature by 
                                                          
1
18For a detailed analysis on the reasons for productivity differences across countries, see Gancia and Zilibotti (2009). 
2
19For an empirical study, see Murakami (2009). 
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extending the limited discussions on human capital accumulation in endogenous growth theory 
including migration dimension. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
existing literature and presents the main frameworks used in the paper. Section 3 details the 
benchmark model by highlighting the skill-biased migration decision and optimal education 
decision of parents. Section 4 presents the main results of the impact of technological change on 
human capital accumulation under certain conditions in both migrant sending and receiving 
countries. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. The Literature Review 
International migration not only changes the population size but also affects the human 
capital stock of countries. Besides resource allocation, migration can be considered as a movement 
of knowledge, abilities, talents and productivity. In the economic literature, human capital 
accumulation plays an important role as one of the pivotal engines of growth. The concepts of 
human capital and migration are, therefore, interconnected issues making it essential to understand 
the economic consequences of migration on human capital accumulation in both host and home 
countries.   
Public discussions do not solely focus on illegal migration based economic issues, but also 
express doubts about economic contribution of legal migration. For example, the question of 
whether skilled migrants affect the returns to human capital investments of natives adversely or not 
has been started to address in the economic literature in recent years. Azarnert (2010) reveals the 
underlying reason of this question by showing two opposite growth effects of skilled immigration 
that can be either growth enhancing or growth depleting. If skilled immigration has an adverse 
effect on educational incentives for natives, this effect reduces the positive contribution of the 
foreign brains to the receiving country’s human capital stock, and thus, hampers economic growth 
of that country. Azarnert emphasizes this negative relation by underlining the fact that the size of 
skilled immigration flows is not small. The numbers for international migration increased from 74 
million to 188 million between 1960 and 2010, which refers a slightly increase, from 2.7% to 2.8% 
with respect to the share of world population. However, the figures change when only high skilled 
migration is taken into consideration. As a result of globalization, technological changes, and 
selective immigration policies the type of world migration has been evolving to skilled migration. 
The number of highly skilled immigrants living in the OECD countries increased by 70% during the 
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1990s while low skilled immigrants increased by 30%.
320
Another factor is mentioned that there 
exists an uncertainty with regard to the labor market opportunities for the native population 
(occupational mismatch for skilled natives) as a result of the arrival of the foreign competitors.  
Earlier studies such as Regets (2001), Bellettini and Ceroni (2002), Borjas (2007, 2009) also 
provide different results about the impacts of migration on educational incentives in receiving 
countries at micro and macro level. According to Regets (2001) a positive correlation exists 
between increased enrolments in graduate programs by foreign and by native students in the US. 
Bellettini and Ceroni (2002) argue that the opening up of borders to immigrants brings an upward 
shift in the steady-state fraction of skilled native workers when the host economy succeeds in 
attracting highly skilled foreign agents above a certain threshold. Otherwise the steady-state fraction 
of skilled natives would be unchanged. Unlike Regets (2001), Bellettini and Ceroni (2002), Borjas 
(2007, 2009) state that an exogenous increase in the supply of skilled labor due to the skilled 
migration may adversely affect the educational incentives of natives. In line with Azarnert (2010)’s 
occupational mismatch hypothesis, Borjas finds that skilled migrants crowd out the native labor in 
several high skilled fields in the US job market. 
There are several studies that also examine the impacts of skilled migration on economic 
growth via the implications on human capital accumulation. Addition to receiving country analyses, 
Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997, 1998), Vidal (1998) and Beine et al. (2001, 2008) are 
influential studies showing that migration prospects can raise the expected return on human capital 
in home countries. The effects of skilled migration on economic growth are identified in two groups 
such as static effects and dynamic effects by Mountford and Rapoport (2011). While static effects 
imply an increase in fertility rates, and a reduction in the incentives to become a skilled worker; 
dynamic effects imply positive effects on the proportion of agents who choose to become skilled 
workers. The authors argue that if dynamic effects are sufficiently high than static effects, human 
capital accumulation and thus, growth in receiving country increase in the long run. For the case of 
sending country, the emigration of skilled workers might reduce the human capital stock; however, 
on the other hand, the possibility of emigration to a developed country may increase the incentive to 
accumulate human capital, and may decrease the fertility rate in the origin country. Therefore, 
whether brain drain decreases growth or not is an ambiguous statement for sending countries.  
After having formed an opinion about the relationship between skilled migration and human 
capital accumulation, we can now formulate the theoretical proposition upon which we base the 
main argument in this paper. Acemoglu (2002) shows that biased technological change shifts out 
                                                          
320For details see Gibson and McKenzie (2011) and Docquier and Rapoport (2012). 
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the relative demand curve for a factor (here skilled workers) so its relative marginal product 
(relative wages) increases at given factor proportions (given the relative quantity of factors). The 
key point is that technological change demands high skilled labor; and therefore, the return to 
education would be higher under skill-biased technology. Docquier (2007) emphasizes that the 
educational structure of international migration is getting more skill-biased as a result of drastic 
rises in educational attainment in developing countries accompanied by an increase in demographic 
sizes. As Beine et al. (2008) state, the choice of migration has been affected by skill-biased 
technology. It is important to mention here that in a recent study, Fadinger and Mayr (2012) – 
which will also play an important role in defining the migration decisions in our model – both 
empirically and theoretically show that depending on the elasticity of substitution between skilled 
and unskilled workers, an SBTC decreases the brain drain. In other words, what Fadinger and Mayr 
explicitly say that incentive to emigration (outflow) decreases under an SBTC. This finding is also 
be supported by earlier Beine et al. (2008) and Mountford and Rapoport (2011). Both studies argue 
that higher technological growth in advanced economies increases the incentives for foreign agents 
to migrate to advanced economies. Individuals in less developed countries may invest in education 
to get high-skill jobs and high wages through an increase in their probabilities of migration. So this 
makes a contribution to the human capital accumulation in home countries. Additionally, the 
growth rate of technology in the advanced economy increases due to the raise in the accumulated 
stock of skilled labor, and this in turn increases the incentives for skilled agents to migrate to the 
advanced economy, and also increases the incentives for human capital in the advanced economy 
itself.  
What Fadinger and Mayr (2012) demonstrate us is that SBTC leads a reduction in migration 
incentives of natives. From a different perspective it means that SBTC increases the migration 
incentives of foreigners. Throughout this paper we assume that SBTC is a pull factor for skilled 
foreigners and implicitly we accept that incentives for migration (inflow) increase to a country 
where an SBTC exists. However, we still need to point out how SBTC affects the human capital 
stock in both home and host countries. If we return to Acemoglu (2002), one can notice that human 
capital is exogenously given, and the international labor mobility is not taken into account in the 
model. On the other hand, we have a perfect knowledge of how the relative wage ratio and 
technological development increase the incentives for skilled individuals to move towards the 
advanced economies. This immigration might have either positive or negative effects on human 
capital formation in sending and receiving countries. Nevertheless, a theoretical illustration problem 
related to the current model appears. We need a demonstration for human capital accumulation in 
the Acemoglu model.  
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Most of the existing literature does not explicitly account for this issue, but Eggebrecht 
(2009) and Gancia and Zilibotti (2009).  Only these two studies attempt to extend the Acemoglu 
model by identifying a mechanism which augments the model of directed technical change with 
educational investments. Eggebrecht (2009) develops a closed economy framework, and focuses on 
wage differences between skilled and unskilled workers. The author argues that expected wages are 
one of the crucial determinants of the current and future education decisions of individuals, and 
therefore, the impact of SBTC on human capital accumulation can be demonstrated via changes in 
wage ratios. The model of Gancia and Zilibotti (2009) differs from Eggebrecht (2009) in explaining 
the mechanism. Their argument is that human capital is a complementary factor in production; 
therefore, the extent to which it is involved in production depends on the degree of competition in 
markets. Firms, which are stimulated by rising monopoly power, seek high profits, and put pressure 
on wages; thus, the return to human capital.  
To summarize, both empirical and theoretical findings raise the following questions: (i) In 
an Acemoglu-type of growth model including migration, what kind of changes can be examined in 
human capital accumulation in both sending and receiving countries? (ii) How can be these changes 
modeled in an open economy allowing skilled labor migration, and (iii) To what extent the optimal 
education decisions of parents are affected under SBTC with migration? The following section lays 
out the basic model and introduces the conditions of the economies to answer the aforementioned 
questions.  
3. The Model  
This section presents the benchmark model, which is based on a simplified version of the 
Acemoglu-type growth model (1998, 2002) and in turn related to Fadinger and Mayr (2012) and 
also Gancia and Zilibotti (2009). The main assumption in this model is that human capital may also 
be accumulated through migration prospects. The argument underlying this assumption is based on 
the studies mentioned in section 2 and the report of the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM 2003) as well. This report accurately shows that “prospects of working abroad have 
increased the expected return to additional years of education and led many people to invest in 
more schooling, especially in occupations in high demand overseas.” 
3.1 Production and Technological Structure  
In Acemoglu model (1998, 2002), an economy is given with two different factors of production, 
L  and H , corresponding to unskilled and skilled workers respectively. Output is categorized as 
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final and sectoral final outputs. The final output sector is perfectly competitive, and aggregate 
production function is given by a CES production function:  
      
1 1 1
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where LY  and HY  are sectoral final outputs which demonstrate L  and H  intensive productions, and  
  is the elasticity of substitution between the factors and  0,   . The product markets clearing 
condition gives the aggregate demand and the relative demand for sectoral aggregates: 
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The price of the final output is assumed as a numeraire, which implies 
1 1 1H LP P P
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Sectoral final outputs are produced under perfect competition and given by the following 
production functions: 
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where L and H intensive outputs are produced by using a range of sector specific differentiated 
inputs (or “machines”)  Ly i and  Hy i  with elasticity of substitution 1  . The range of 
intermediate inputs LA and HA  (used with unskilled and high skilled labors) allow technical change 
to be biased. We assume that technology monopolist supplies these inputs by using skilled and 
unskilled labor during the production process. LA and HA  are given exogenously now, but with the 
39 
 
discussion of skill bias of technology, LA and HA  will be determined endogenously in the following 
subsection.  
Since sectoral output markets are competitive, profit maximization functions of firms can be written 
as 
 
   
0, ( )
max
L
L
A
L L L L L i
L y i
P Y w L p i y i d                                               (8) 
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H H H H H i
H y i
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where Lp  and Hp   are given and denote the rental prices of machines, and Lw  and Hw  are the 
wages of unskilled and skilled workers. From the first order condition we obtain the following 
inverse demand functions: 
   
11
L L L Lp i y i Y P


                                                          (10) 
   
11
H H H Hp i y i Y P


                                                       (11) 
Gancia and Zilibotti (2009) and Fadinger and Mayr (2012) give the state of technology for the 
intermediate inputs as  l i  and  Zh i . Z is a parameter which  ensures the equilibrium skill 
premium is always positive ( 1Z  ). Each intermediate input  Ly i and  Hy i  is subject to the 
resource constraints  
0
LA
L iy i d L  and  0
HA
H iy i d H . Here we will follow the same 
demonstration
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of Fadinger and Mayr (2012) to obtain an expression of wage premium. Later, we 
will see that the wage premium will play a crucial role to express the human capital accumulation 
under SBTC. In this respect, the production function for each input can be written as 
   Ly i l i                                                                   (12) 
   Hy i Zh i                                                                (13) 
Substituting (12) and (13) into the demand functions (10) and (11), we can define the revenue of 
technology monopolists as the following functions: 
                                                          
4
21Fadinger and Mayr define the labor market clearing conditions by the following equities:  
0
LA
El i di L  and 
 
0
HA
Eh i di H where EH ( )EL H ( )L  denotes the aggregate employment level of skilled (unskilled) workers in the 
labor market. Therefore, 
E
H
H
x
H
 ,
E
L
L
x
L
  shows the employment rates measuring the labor market tightness which also 
express the probability of finding a job for a skilled (unskilled) individual in that labor market.    
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     
11
L L L Lp i y i l i Y P



                                                 (14) 
       
11
H H H Hp i y i Zh i Y P



                                            (15) 
The monopolists tend to choose an optimal employment level that maximizes their profits. Fadinger 
and Mayr assume that the firms and workers get fractions (2 1)     and ( 1) (2 1)    of the 
revenue respectively. Then the firm chooses an optimal level of employment, and this allows the 
firm to set an optimal price equal to 
   
1
1
1L L Lp i p i w


 
   
 
                                                  (16) 
   
1
1
1 HH H
w
p i p i
Z

 
   
 
                                                (17) 
Given the pricing and labor market conditions, optimal profits of the firms can also be shown as 
 
2 1
L Lp l i





  and   
2 1
H Hp Zh i





                                  (18) 
From the labor market clearing conditions we get ( ) E Ll i L A and ( ) E Hh i H A . Using the 
symmetry, we can express the final output production functions as    
L L EY A L  and H H EY A ZH                                               (19) 
Substituting these sectoral production functions in (4) we can rewrite the relative demand function 
as 
1
H L E
L H E
P A L
P A ZH
   
   
   
                                                         (20) 
For given levels of technology - ,L HA A - relative wages or skill premium   (21) and relative 
profitability (22) can be obtained from (16), (17), (18), and (20) by noting the fact that the revenue 
of the intermediate sectors equals to expenditure on sectoral intermediates, 
,L E L L H E H Hp L P Y p ZH P Y  . 
                                               
1 1
H H H H E
L L L L E
w P ZA ZA L
w P A A H

 


   
      
   
                                    (21)      
1 1
H H E L E
L L E H E
P ZH A ZH
P L A L

 


   
     
   
                                       (22)        
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3.2 Skill-Biased Technological Change  
As Acemoglu (1998, 2002) mentions, firms make innovations for new technologies to get 
higher profits, and technological progress is directed towards abundant factors. If we look at the 
relative profitability function (22) we see that profits depend on two components: prices and market 
size.  
In endogenous technological change, we assume that innovation can take the form of new 
varieties of intermediate inputs and requires a fixed cost    in each sector L  and H .  
Intermediate producers make zero profit due to free entry; therefore, what is relevant for them is the 
net present discounted value ( , )L HV V  of all profits in the future.  LV  and HV can be expressed as 
L L LrV V     and  H H HrV V                                            (23) 
The term   is the interest rate which is assumed constant in the future, and in the case of steady state 
the V terms are equal to 0. Then we can write, 
L
LV r

   and  HHV r

                                                (24) 
Note that the net present value of the firms cannot exceed the innovation costs  L HV V    and 
this requires the following condition,  1H L   .  
1 1
1H H E L E
L L E H E
P ZH A ZH
P L A L

 


   
     
   
                                  (25) 
From (25) we can obtain the skill bias of technology: 
1
H E
L E
A ZH
A L
 
   
   
   
                                                   (26) 
And lastly, substituting (26) into (21) we get an expression for the skill premium  *  which 
depends on relative skilled employment and technology Z .  
2
* 1H E
L E
w H
Z
w L



     
 
                                             (27) 
According to (26), Acemoglu argues that if the elasticity of substitution between factors is greater 
than unity, the market size dominates the price effect; therefore, the firms choose to produce 
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technologies that are biased towards the abundant factor. One can also infer from (27) that the skill 
premium is increasing in relative skilled workers as long as elasticity of substitution between the 
factors is greater than 2. This shows the relative demand for skilled labor has to be sufficiently 
elastic for the skill premium to increase in relative skills.
522
  
3.3 Migration Decision under SBTC 
As it is demonstrated in section 2, we can find strong theoretical and empirical evidences for the 
impacts of SBTC on migration incentives. The probability of getting high-skilled intensive jobs and 
high wages stimulate the choice of migration. Therefore, we allow migration decisions (as an 
exogenous variable) in the model with the skill specific emigration rates    as illustrated by 
Fadinger and Mayr (2012). They assume that workers decide about emigration to maximize their 
utility: “If expected utility for an individual   with skill type ,H L  associated with migration  M  is 
greater than the utility associated with staying  S  in the country of origin, the individual i  chooses 
to emigrate or otherwise stays at home”.623 
  M Si i is prob U i U        ,i H L        0 is                      (28) 
3.4 Human Capital Accumulation under SBTC 
Previous sections show that skill biased technological progress leads to an increase in 
demand for skilled labor and thus, an increase in the wages of skilled labor. If a greater wage 
differential occurs among different labor markets, this also leads an incentive for immigration of 
skilled workers following the rise in wage premium at the host country. But first, we need model 
how to see the impact of SBTC on human capital accumulation. Eggebrecht (2009) explains the link 
between technological change and human capital accumulation through the changes in the level of 
wages and wage inequality. Therefore this section will follow identically Eggebrecht’s argument. 
As a rational expectation, the wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers affects the 
present and future education decisions of the agents because of the fact that the return from the 
accumulation of skill is greater than the return from not accumulating skill.  
                                                          
522Acemoglu (2002) points out that whether technological change is skill biased or not depends on the elasticity of 
substitution between the factors. If this elasticity is greater than 1, the factors are gross substitutes, and an increase in 
HA relative to LA increases the marginal productivity of skilled workers. On the contrary, if the elasticity is less than 1, 
the factors are gross complements, and therefore an increase in HA  relative to LA reduces the marginal productivity of 
skilled workers. 
6
23Note that migration itself has some skill-specific individual costs like traveling costs, getting working permissions, 
moving homes, the unification of families, etc. For a variety of reasons these costs can differ according to the skill 
levels of the migrants. For the sake of simplicity, in this study we assume that skill-specific subjective costs are 
exogenously given and the same for all skilled individuals.   
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After this brief clarification on the relation between human capital accumulation and wage 
premium, the effects of SBTC on human capital accumulation can be expressed as the following 
steps. 
3.4.1 Cost of Education 
To obtain an expression of cost of education with respect to skill levels of parents this section 
demonstrates the approach of Eggebrecht (2009). Parents are assumed to always behave rationally 
while they are making education decisions for their children. Therefore there is no uncertainty, and 
parents have a perfect foresight over future wage levels for skilled and unskilled jobs. Being skilled 
or unskilled not only depends on parents’ decisions but is also subject to parents’ budget constraint, 
which is given by  
i i i iw c ne                      0,1i                                          (29) 
where the variables iw , ic  and ie  denote parent’s i  wage income, consumption and education cost 
per child respectively. n  denotes the number of children (fertility rate)  and has only a multiplier 
effect on children’s average wage income. This multiplier does not change the results qualitatively. 
For simplicity reasons, fertility decision of parents is given exogenously. Optimal education 
decision i  shows the proportion of children from parent i  who receive education and 
endogenously determined by the parents. Skilled adults have a key role in education, and they can 
transfer the skill and knowledge to their children like teachers. Eggebrecht assumes that since 
skilled wages are greater or equal to unskilled wages, the skilled parents never invest less in 
education compared to unskilled ones; therefore, education cost is supposed to be equal a 
proportion of the wage of skilled parents like    and can be shown as the following equation: 
i He w                  0,1                                             (30) 
Regarding (30), there are two crucial points. First, the education decision depends positively on 
parental wage income. The second is whether this cost is affordable for parents or not. Using (30), 
we can get relative education cost for skilled and unskilled parents according to the ratio  i ie w . 
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For skilled parents, relative education cost is independent on wage premium and is determined by 
the parameter . For unskilled parents, relative education cost is given by  H
L
w
w

.
724
 
3.4.2 Optimal Education Decision 
Parents’ optimal education decision is simply a constrained maximization problem. It is 
assumed that each parent  ,i H L  shares the same utility function and maximizes it subject to a 
budget constraint.    
 1 1max ln ln
i
i i L H L
t t t i t tU c w w w

           
       s.t.      i i i iw c ne            (31) 
As can be seen from  (31) parents have a utility function for parent i which includes two 
components. The first is their own consumption and the second is the quality of their children. The 
parameter   denotes the altruism of the parents, and  0,1  .  1
H
tw   and 1
L
tw   represent the wage 
incomes of skilled and unskilled children of the parents in the future period. The solution of this 
maximization problem with respect to optimal education decision is obtained as 
1
1 1
0
1
1
1
i
i L
t t
H L
i t t
w w
ne w w




 





  
  
   
            
 
 
1
0,
1
1
1,
1
.
if
if
else






                         (32)                                      
Eggebrecht (2009) mentions that parents have three different decision type for the education of their 
children. First, they may not invest in the education of any children ( 0)i  ; second, they may 
invest in the education all their children ( 1)i  . Finally, they may invest in education of some of 
                                                          
724If 1   then ie would be equal to Hw  so that such an education cost together with the expenditure for consumption, 
which would be over budget constraint, could not be plausible for both skilled and unskilled parents. Under skill-biased 
technical change, the demand curve for skilled labor is upward sloping, and this increases the high skilled wage faster 
than unskilled wage  
H L
w w . This implies that, under  
H L
w w  , the relative education cost for unskilled parents 
would be greater than 1, and this would be not affordable. In addition, 0    is also not plausible for skilled and 
unskilled parents. For a while, suppose that the wage premium H
L
w
w
  is less than 1. Thus,  H Lw w . In this case, 
skilled agents would tend to apply for unskilled positions which do not correspond to their skill levels. As long as the 
labor demand corresponds the labor supply there would be no more intention to accumulate skills under a closed 
economy framework. However, in reality the prospects of getting higher wages from abroad through international labor 
mobility can provide the necessary condition  H L FHw w w  , which leads parents to invest more in education of 
their children.  
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their children (0 1)i  . It should be noted that even though the fertility rate n  is given 
exogenously, higher fertility rates imply that investing in education of the same proportion i  is 
getting more costly for parents compared to the lower fertility rate. Therefore, Eggebrecht argues 
that the future proportion of skilled adults in the population is determined by the current education 
decisions of skilled  H  and unskilled adults  L  and is derived as the following: 
            
1
1
1 1 1
1
1
H H
t
L
t
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w


  

 
 
  
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 
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w
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w


  

 
 
  
  
 
 
              (33) 
These equations make it obvious that - while optimal education decisions of - skilled parents are 
affected by future wage inequality, the education decisions of low skilled parents depend on both 
current wage ratio and the future wage inequality relative to unskilled labor
825
. 
4. Equilibrium with Human Capital Accumulation under SBTC with Migration 
The brain drain is one of the growing concerns of development issues because of its 
detrimental effects on public finance, growth and productivity at origin countries. We accept that 
this concept is much more apparent in less developed countries rather than developed countries 
(Gibson and McKenzie 2011). Skilled people in technologically less developed countries hardly 
find the proper jobs to show their knowledge and to perform at their maximum capabilities and 
capacities. Additionally, we know from the theory and eq. (27) that the countries in which the 
elasticity between the factors remains below a certain threshold, the demand curve for high skilled 
labor is downward sloping. Thus, an increase in the relative number of skilled workers leads to a 
decrease in their wages. As a result of this, the employment opportunities for skilled workers with 
high wages lessen in that labor market; therefore, educated individuals show an intention to move to 
the countries where skill biased technology has actually occurred.  
This paper differs from Fadinger and Mayr (2012) with regard to the direction of the 
migration flow according to the place where the SBTC occurs. Here, SBTC only occurs in 
technologically advanced economies (host countries). Therefore, we do not assume a brain drain 
issue in these countries. However, developing and less developed countries struggle against brain 
drain due to the lack of sufficient technological development favoring high-skilled labor. The effort 
of these countries consists entirely of the adaptation (or imitation) of these technologies. We argue 
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that the direction of brain drain moves towards technologically abundant countries from less 
developed countries.  
After having defined the behaviors of firms and of individuals’ decisions on investment in 
education in previous sections, we can now write the equilibrium for the effects of SBTC on human 
capital accumulation under migration for sending and receiving countries.  
4.1  Less Developed (Migrant Sending) Country Case 
In this case we examine how an SBTC in an advanced economy affects the human capital 
formation of a less developed country under skill-biased migration. The main argument of this case 
is that the SBTC does not occur in the migrant sending country but in the advanced (receiving) 
country. Therefore, the skill premium function is given as obtained earlier in equation (21) in the 
less developed country. We assume that skilled wages  Htw  and unskilled wages  Ltw  are initially 
the same in both countries. There are two periods, t  and 1t  . In period t , we suppose that the 
relative number of skilled individuals increases in the less developed country while an SBTC occurs 
in the advanced economy. As it can be seen from equation (21), an increase in the relative supply of 
skilled labor in time t  results a decrease in their wages relative to the unskilled in time 1t  . But in 
the meanwhile according to equation (27), the relative wages of skilled labor are increasing in the 
advanced economy due to presence of SBTC. This would lead to a difference in wages of skilled 
labor among the countries at time 1t  . It should be noted that relative skill premium functions (21) 
and (27) are also an expression of relative marginal productivity of workers. According to equation 
(21), relative marginal productivity of skilled workers decreases in the relative abundance of high 
skilled employment in the less developed country. Therefore, skilled workers in less developed 
country would have an incentive to emigrate to the advanced economy to maximize their utility. 
In addition to this intention, the prospects of getting higher wages through being a skilled 
worker in an advanced economy would encourage the parents living in less developed countries to 
invest in education of their children. For the sake of simplicity issue, unskilled wages are taken 
constant in all time periods. Therefore at time 1t  , the wages of unskilled labor will remain the 
same as the wage level  Ltw  at time    926 
In order to see the indirect effects of SBTC on optimal education decisions in a less developed 
country under skill-biased migration, an expression of expected wages as a function of a skill-
                                                          
926Unskilled wages are assumed as the minimum wage that low-skilled workers can sell their labor. This wage is 
determined by the negotiations between governments and labor unions. In the short run these wage level is always 
constant.   
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specific immigration rate must be defined because of the presence of the terms  1Htw   and  1Ltw   in 
(33). Based on the modified standard model of Fadinger and Mayr (2012), a skilled (unskilled) 
individual searches for a work with the probability of  H E L Ex H H x L L  . Thus, when an 
SBTC occurs, the expected wages under skill biased migration for a skilled (unskilled) worker in 
less developed country ,
1
H D
tw    ,1L Dtw   can be derived as a function of wages of the advanced 
country.  
     
 
, ,
1
1
H D H A E
t t H H
H
H
w w x w
s H
  

                    0 Hs                    (34) 
 
, ,
1
1
L D L A E
t t L L
L
L
w w x w
s L
  

                      0 Ls                    (35) 
Note that SBTC is one of the pull factors of high skilled immigration. It is crucial to re-emphasize 
here that in a technologically advanced country, a brain drain issue does not take place because of 
the occurrence of the SBTC. Unlike Fadinger and Mayr (2012), the sign of the term Hs  is given 
positive in Eq. (34). If there is no migration possibility from less developed country to advanced 
economy, Hs  would be equal to 0. Additionally, as a natural result of SBTC, in the short run only 
skilled labor is able to move. Due to the high migration costs (such as language barriers, visa costs, 
government fees and etc.)  low-skilled workers cannot migrate in the short run. Hence, Ls  are given 
0 in the model, and the cost of migration for skilled labor is assumed very low. To simplify the 
analysis this cost is also taken as zero.  
After having defined the expected wages, we can obtain the relative expected wage as the 
following: 
 
1
1 1
H
t H H H E
L
t L L L H E
w w x w H L
w w x w s H L


    
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     
                                        (36) 
Substituting the relative skill premium function (27) into (36), we can rearrange the expression of 
relative expected wages as a function of the skill-specific emigration rate under the impact of 
endogenous technology. 
 
1
1
1 1
H
t E
L
t E H
w ZH L
w L s H
 


  
   
    
                                                    (37) 
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The first expression on the right hand side in (37) is the skill-bias of technology that we already 
defined for  H LA A  in (26), and the latter gives the relative endowments of unskilled workers 
under skill-biased migration. Note that, there is an adverse effect of skilled migration on relative 
expected wages according to equation (37), but an increase in HA  relative to LA  with a sufficient 
elasticity of substitution increases the marginal product of skilled workers in future periods and 
smooths over the adverse effect of migration on skilled wages; thus, relative expected wages 
increase. 
For given levels of technology, relative wages in the less developed country at time   has been 
given by (21). Using the inverse function of (21) and expected wages as a function of skill-bias of 
technology with migration (37), we can rewrite the optimal education decisions (33) of skilled and 
low-skilled parents in the less developed country as the following equations (38) and (39) 
respectively. 
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                          (39) 
Skill-bias of technological change depends on the elasticity of substitution between the factors 
as mentioned in section 3. If the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently high,  2   with an 
increase in relative employment workers  E EH L , relative technology  H LA A  is biased towards 
the employment factor, which is relatively more abundant. Breaking the Eq. (39) into two parts, we 
can observe that the initial part (before minus) shows the impact of current wages on education 
decisions, the following part (after minus) shows the effect of expected wages determined according 
to advanced county. Making a clarification here is very important: when the migration possibility is 
getting higher for the skilled individuals, they do not want to work in less qualified jobs and they 
tend to migrate to technologically developed countries. This means that the factors become gross 
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complements and therefore, the elasticity of substitution between the factors is always less than 1. 
This clearly explains why some countries have a brain drain issue.   
To see the impacts of SBTC on human capital accumulation in the less developed country, we 
have to define H  and L  in terms of relative technologies  H LA A  according to Eq. (26), with an 
elasticity of substitution 1   for the less developed country for the current wage part of optimal 
education decision functions in the case for migrant sending country.   
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And, lastly, these two equations (40) and (41) enable us to see the effects of technological change. 
Taking derivatives of education decisions H and L with respect to  H LA A , we can make an 
intuition on the direction of the education decisions of parents.  
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As can be seen from the derivatives, both skilled and less-skilled parents increase their investment 
in education for their children when   is sufficiently low in their countries. This result shows that 
an SBTC in an advanced economy can stimulate the investment in education and has positive 
effects on human capital formation in less developed countries, as long as the probability of getting 
high wages through migration is high.  
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4.2  Advanced (Migrant Receiving) Country Case 
As the previous case showed, by substituting the inverse relative wages (27) and expected 
wages (37) under prospects of skilled migration, we obtain the expressions for the optimal 
education decision (33) of high skilled and unskilled parents in the receiving country, as in the 
following equations (42) and (43) respectively. 
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In this case we will follow the same analysis employed for the less developed country. Taking 
the derivative of optimal education decisions of skilled and less skilled parents with respect to 
technological change shows how human capital accumulation is affected under skilled migration. It 
is a natural consequence of Eggebrecht’s model that optimal education decision formulation of 
skilled parents is identical for both developed and less developed country cases. Therefore 
according to Eq. (42) we observe that skilled parents always have the same characteristics, and they 
increase their investment in education for their children under SBTC.  
For less skilled parents’ education decisions, if we rewrite the Eq. (43) in terms of skill-bias 
technology, we obtain the following: 
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And lastly, taking derivative of 
L
  with respect to  H LA A , we have the following result: 
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From equation (27) we observe that SBTC affects the skilled wages positively thus, skill 
premium increases. This brings an additional cost to less skilled parents to afford the same amount 
of investment in education as skilled parents do. In other words, a higher current wage ratio leads to 
a higher relative education cost for less skilled parents. This implies a negative effect on human 
capital accumulation. An interesting feature of the current result is that, adding migration 
component would not have a negative effect on the impact of SBTC on educations decisions of less-
skilled parents. These findings are in line with the results of Eggebrecht (2009). 
As can be seen in equation (44), the exponent of relative technology  H LA A  in the first bracket 
is minus one, and this reduces the human capital accumulation. However the later effect, the 
probability of earning skilled wages in the future, keeps the parents from investing more in 
education according to their budget constraint. Therefore, the net effect of SBTC on human capital 
accumulation for less skilled parents can be either positive, negative or zero.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper introduces a new dimension to the effects of SBTC on human capital 
accumulation from the perspectives of an Acemoglu-type growth model with migration. Inclusion 
of migration decision enables us to see the effects of SBTC on human capital accumulation in 
migrant sending countries as well. The model depends on two main assumptions: First, SBTC 
occurs only in technologically advanced countries that are also characterized as migrant receiving 
countries. Second, SBTC stimulates the incentives of individuals to migrate technologically 
advanced economies.  
The paper draws several conclusions: (i) Optimal education decisions of high skilled parents 
in both host and home countries are positively affected by an SBTC. (ii) However, results differ for 
low skilled parents. While an SBTC affects the optimal education decisions of less-skilled parents 
positively in migrant sending countries, the net effect in receiving countries is ambiguous. (iii) Our 
findings also reveal that the net impact of SBTC on human capital accumulation in receiving 
countries depends on the modelling structure of the sign relationship between expected wages and 
migration impact. We can also show a negative effect of skilled migration on human capital 
accumulation. The intuition behind this result is straightforward: If there is a strong expectation in 
the labor market of receiving country that the impact of migration on wages would be negative (as it 
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is also modeled in this paper), skilled-migration also leads to a negative effect on optimal education 
decisions of local parents. However, with an increase in relative technologies due to SBTC, the 
marginal product of skilled workers increases, and expected wages would continue to increase 
under skilled migration until the skilled-wage levels come to the equilibrium among countries in the 
long run (iii) Consequently, since the probability of getting high wages through migration is high, 
and migration is permissible among the countries, SBTC positively affects the human capital 
accumulation in less developed countries. However, the net effect of SBTC on human capital 
accumulation is uncertain in advanced countries under skilled migration.  
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CHAPTER 3
27
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DILUTION EFFECTS, POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  
UNDER HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND  
ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
*
 
  
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The paper analyzes the impact of population growth on economic growth under 
endogenous technological change and human capital investment. The novelty of this chapter is the 
inclusion of a “dilution effect” of population growth on per capita human capital accumulation, 
which is not present in the original Uzawa-Lucas model. The present paper has showed that an 
increase in the population growth rate yields an ambiguous impact on the growth rate of per-capita 
income due to the relative contribution of two distinct effects of population growth: The direct 
dilution effect and the indirect ideas effect. This study revealed that the dilution effect has a central 
role in explaining the ambiguous impact of population growth on economic growth. When the 
dilution effect is sufficiently low, an unambiguously positive correlation between population growth 
and economic growth is obtained. When it is sufficiently high the correlation may be either positive 
or negative or neutral. Another result is that more population growth generates an indirect ideas 
effect on the rate of innovation and economic growth. These evidences are empirically checked for 
the advanced countries. 
 
 
  
 
                                                          
*27This paper is a joint work with Prof. Alberto Bucci. In particular, we would like to thank Prof. Emanuele Bacchiocchi, Dr. 
Spyridon Boikos and Dr. Pinar Deniz for their comments and constructive suggestions during the empirical analyses.   
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the United Nations has consistently called attention to the importance of 
addressing the economic issues which mainly rely upon the reality in the world population. 
Population division of the UN captures that even under the assumption of decreasing fertility rates it 
is a fact that the world population reached to 7.2 billion in mid-2013 [...] and it is projected to reach 
9.6 billion in 2050 by increasing more than 2.4 billion more than in 2013 (UN, 2013a, pp.1-5). 
Additionally, in another report of the UN it is emphasized that new population patterns and trends 
strongly demand differentiated policies and programmes both at national and international levels. 
According to this report “In the past two decades, many governments in less developed regions have 
realized the importance of reducing high rates of population growth, while a growing number of 
governments in more developed regions have expressed concerns about low rates of population 
growth...” (UN, 2013b, p. 1). The latter fact shows that the correlation between population and 
economic prosperity may vary with the level of economic progress.  
The relationship between population and economic growth has always been 
comprehensively taken into account by the economists and the policy makers. From the economic 
point of view, - starting from the Malthusian theory - studies on the impact of population growth on 
economic growth can be categorized as follows: Pessimist, optimist and neutralist views. According 
to the pessimistic views, population growth has detrimental effects on economic growth. Simply 
they claim that economic resources (such as food supply) are fixed in the long run, and 
technological progress is also limited against increasing population.
 128
Unlike pessimists, optimists 
argue that population growth affects economic growth positively due to the endogenous 
technological progress and scale effects of larger populations.
229
Last group, neutralists claim that 
the impact of population growth on economic growth is so little (either positive or negative or non-
existent) that can be negligible.
330
  
Until now, the literature revealed that “[...] population growth is not all good or all bad for 
economic growth” as Kelly and Schmidt (1995, p. 554) argue in their paper. Instead of asking “what 
is the net impact of population growth on economic growth?”, asking the question of “why does 
population growth affect countries’ economic growth differently?” would be much more significant 
in order to get an accurate answer about the sign of the relationship between population growth and 
                                                          
1
28For the main proponents of this group, see Malthus (1798), Coale and Hoover (1958), Ehrlich (1968). In the standard growth 
theory where savings rate and technological change are exogenous, population growth lowers income because of the (physical) 
capital dilution. For some empirical studies, see Mankiw et al. (1992), Ahituv (2001), Li and Zhang (2007) and Herzer et al. (2012).    
2
29For some models (with endogenous technological change) in which population size (and/or growth) affects economic growth 
positively; see Kuznets (1967), Boserup (1981), Simon (1981), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt 
(1992), Kremer (1993), Jones (1995).   
3
30For an example; see Srinivasan (1988). 
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economic growth.
 
Prettner (2013), Romero (2013) and Mierau and Turnovsky (2014) argue that the 
role of demography is another factor to evaluate the relation between population and economic 
growth.
 
However; the nature of the demographic changes (mortality, fertility and ageing) is not at 
the focus of this paper.
431
Both theoretical and empirical studies in the (endogenous growth) 
literature have showed that “...Whether population growth or population size foster or hamper 
economic growth strongly depends on the modelling framework...” (Prettner and Prskawetz, 2010, 
p. 607). 
In the light of this wide literature, this paper attempts to analyze the impact of population 
growth on economic growth under endogenous technological change and human capital investment 
by agents. The model we study in this paper is based on an endogenous growth model with 
expanding variety of products
532
where return to specialization is always positive. We consider a 
closed economy in which final output, intermediate and research sectors are vertically integrated, 
and there are three types of homogenous agents which are perfectly mobile and fully employed. In 
this economy governmental activity does not exist, population grows exogenously, and there is no 
external shock such as migration. Individuals are assumed to spend their time to work and invest in 
human capital. 
The important novelty of this paper comes from a critic which is not presented in the 
original Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) model. Lucas (1988) argues that newborns do not reduce 
the current skill level of individuals hence; population growth does not exist in the formulation of 
human capital accumulation. Unlike Lucas, Bucci (2008, p. 2029), Strulik (2005 p. 137) and 
Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001, p. 190) illustrate that population growth decreases the average human 
capital level of an economy, and therefore, has a dilution effect on the accumulation of per-capita 
human capital. Additionally, we know that there are some empirical studies also concluding that the 
population growth has a direct and negative dilution effect on human capital investment.
633
Our 
explanation mainly rests on the inclusion of an explicit dilution effect of population growth on 
human capital accumulation. Then, we extend our benchmark formulation by introducing a 
parameter which measures the strength of this negative effect of population growth on per-capita 
human capital investment.  
                                                          
4
31To address the question, Kelly (1988) provides an extensive review. For some recent substantial analyses, see also Prettner and 
Canning (2014) and Prettner et al. (2013). Lastly, Strulik et al. (2013)’s “child quantity-quality trade off”, and Prettner (2014)’s 
schooling intensity approaches are important examples for showing the adverse effect of population growth on economic growth 
under the R&D-based growth models with human capital accumulation. 
5
32For a detailed explanation of the model structure see Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004, Chp.6, p. 285). 
6
33See Boikos et al. (2013, pp. 52-56). See also Coale and Hoover (1958) for the types of dilution effect of population growth.  
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The objective of the present paper is therefore twofold. First it answers the latter question by 
providing an alternative but complementary theoretical framework that explains why an increase in 
the population growth rate - regardless of the source of demographic change
734
- may yield an 
ambiguous (positive, negative or neutral) impact on the growth rate of per-capita income in the very 
long run. Second, it aims to evaluate that to what extent the dilution effect of population growth 
explains the different rates of economic growth across countries. The results have demonstrated that 
the strength of this dilution effect has a central role in accounting for the ambiguous impact of 
population growth on economic growth along the BGP equilibrium.  Another result of the paper is 
that population growth has an indirect ideas effect on real per-capita income. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the 
benchmark model whose predictions are analyzed along the BGP in Section 3. Section 4 we 
demonstrate the relationship between population growth and per capita income growth under the 
BGP equilibrium. Section 5 is the second part of the paper which aims to test the theoretical results 
empirically. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper, and provides a ground for possible future 
extensions.   
2. The Model 
2.1 Production 
Consider an environment in which three sectors of activity are vertically integrated. The 
research sector is characterized by free entry. Here, firms combine human capital and (eventually) 
the existing number of ideas to engage in innovative activity that results in the invention of new 
blueprints for firms operating in the intermediate sector. The intermediate sector is composed of 
monopolistically competitive firms. There is a distinct firm producing each single variety of 
intermediates/durables and holding a perpetual monopoly power over its sale. In the competitive 
final output sector, atomistic firms produce a homogeneous consumption/ final good/output by 
employing human capital and all the available varieties of intermediate inputs. The representative 
firm producing final output has the following technology:
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7
34Notice that, Boucekkine et al. (2002) also follow a similar method of approach to investigate the effects of population growth on 
economic growth. The authors find a population growth rate which maximizes the growth rate.    
8
35We follow Ethier (1982) and Romer (1987, 1990). 
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In Eq. (1) Y denotes the total production of the homogeneous final good (the numeraire in the 
model), 
ix  and YH  are, respectively, the quantity of the i-th intermediate and human capital input 
employed in the sector. The number of ideas existing at a certain point in time  tn coincides with 
the number of intermediate-input varieties and represents the actual stock of non-rival knowledge 
capital available in the economy. Here, we assume that having a larger number of intermediate-
input varieties do not lead any detrimental effect on aggregate productivity in the production 
process. As a whole, the aggregate production function (1) displays constant returns to scale to the 
two private and rival factor-inputs ( YH  and ix ), with 1 Z and Z corresponding to their shares in 
GDP.
936
When  0;1Z  , final output production takes place by using simultaneously human capital 
and intermediates. 
The inverse demand function for the i-th intermediate reads as:   
1 1( )Z Zit Yt itp Zn H x
         (2) 
Eq. (2) represents that i-th intermediate producer receives its own marginal product at time t , since 
the industry is competitive. In the absence of any strategic interaction across firms in the 
intermediate sector
1037
, the demand for the i-th durable has price elasticity (in absolute  value) equal 
to  1/ 1 1Z  , which coincides with the elasticity of substitution between any two generic 
varieties of capital goods in the final output production. 
In the intermediate sector, firms engage in monopolistic competition.  Each of them 
produces one (and only one) horizontally differentiated durable and must purchase a patented 
design before producing its own output. Thus, the price of the patent represents a fixed entry cost. 
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 3), we assume that local monopolists have access to 
the same one-to-one technology: 
it itx h ,  0; ti n  ,   0;tn       (3) 
                                                          
9
36Since final output is produced competitively under constant returns to scale to rival inputs, at equilibrium YH
 and ix  are rewarded 
according to their own marginal products. Hence,  1 Z   is the share of Y going to human capital and Z  is that accruing to 
intermediate inputs.  
10
37That amounts to assuming that the number of intermediate firms (n) is so large that each of them produces only a very negligible 
share of the total supply of intermediates.  
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where 
ih is the amount of skilled labor (human capital) required in the production of the i-th 
durable, whose output is ix . For given n , Eq. (3) implies that the total amount of human capital 
used in the intermediate sector at time  Itt H is: 
   
0 0
t tn n
it it Itx di h di H        (4) 
By continuing to assume that there exists no strategic interaction across intermediate firms, and 
making use of Eq. (2), maximization of the generic i-th firm’s instantaneous flow of profits leads to 
the usual constant markup rule: 
1 1
it It t tp w w p
Z Z
   ,  0; ti n  ,   0;tn     (5) 
Eq. (5) says that the price is the same for all intermediate goods i  and is equal to a constant markup 
 1 1Z  over the marginal cost of production  Iw . In a moment it will be explained that in this 
economy the whole available stock of human capital  H is employed and spread across production 
of consumption goods  YH , durables  IH , and new ideas  nH . Since it is assumed to be perfectly 
mobile across sectors, at equilibrium human capital will be rewarded according to the same wage 
rate Yt It nt tw w w w   , with Iw  denoting the wage paid to any generic unit of human capital 
employed in the intermediate sector. Under the hypothesis of symmetry – i.e., p  and x  equal 
across i ’s – Eq. (4) leads to: 
/it It t tx H n x  ,    0; ti n     (4’) 
  11 Z Z Zit Yt It tZ Z H H n
       ,   0; ti n     (6) 
Thus, each intermediate firm will decide at time t  to produce the same quantity of output  x , to sell 
it at the same price  p , accruing the same instantaneous profit   . The symmetry across durables 
is a direct consequence of the fact that each intermediate firm uses the same production technology 
(3) and faces the same demand function (see 2 and 5). Notice that,  0;1Z  and the product within 
the square brackets is therefore, greater than zero. t  would have been equal to zero if Z  had been 
equal to one (instantaneous profit are zero in a perfectly-competitive market). Under symmetry, Eq. 
(1) can be recast as: 
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 1 Z Z Rt Yt It tY H H n ,  1 0R Z       (1’) 
where R measures the degree of returns to specialization, that is “[…]The  degree to which society 
benefits from ‘specializing’ production between a larger number of intermediates” (Benassy, 1998, 
p. 63). In the present paper, it is immediate to verify that R is always positive. The hypothesis 0R 
implies that the impact on aggregate productivity (Y ) of having a larger number of intermediate-
input varieties is always positive ( 0n  ) for any 0IH   and 0YH   (see Eq. 1’). According to Eq. 
(1’), the aggregate production function exhibits constant returns to YH and IH  together, but either 
increasing  1R  , or decreasing  0 1R  , or else constant  1R   returns to an expansion of 
variety, while holding the quantity employed of each other input fixed. With respect to other 
settings, this article introduces important novelties. Unlike Devereux et al. (1996a, 1996b, 2000) 
where, if all intermediates are hired in the same quantity x the returns to specialization are either 
unambiguously increasing
1138
 or at most constant,
1239
 we allow for the possibility that the returns to 
specialization might also be decreasing. Unlike Bucci (2013), we explicitly rule out the possibility 
that the returns to specialization R are negative.
1340
 
2.2 Research and Development (R&D) 
There is a large number of small competitive firms undertaking R&D activity. These firms 
produce ideas indexed by zero through an upper bound 0n  . Ideas take the form of new varieties 
of intermediate inputs that are used in the production of final output. They are partially excludable, 
but nonrival. With access to the same stock of knowledge, n , a representative research–firm uses 
only human capital to develop new ideas: 
t t ntn H

 ,   (0) 0n      (7) 
In Eq. (7) is nH the number of people attempting to discover new ideas, and   is the rate at which a 
single researcher can generate a new idea. Since the representative R&D-firm is small with respect 
to the whole sector, it takes   as given. Hence, Eq. (7) suggests that R&D-activity is conducted 
                                                          
11
38In Devereux et al. (1996a, p. 236, Eq. 1; 2000, p. 549, Eq. 1), under symmetry (
ix x , i ) the aggregate production function 
reads as: 1/Y xN  , (0;1)  . Therefore, the degree of returns to specialization equals 1/  , a number clearly larger than one. This 
is the “increasing returns to specialization case” in Devereux et al. (1996b, p. 633, Eq. 4b, with 0  ). 
12
39See Devereux et al. (1996b, p. 633, Eq. 4b, with 1 1/   ). 
13
40A negative R  means that an increase in n would lead to some sort of ‘inefficiency’ in the economy since, following a rise of the 
number of intermediate-good varieties, aggregate GDP (Y) would ceteris paribus decline in this case. 
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under constant returns to scale to the human capital input ( nH ). We postulate that the arrival rate   
has the following specification: 
11 nt
t t
t
H
n
H





 , 0  ,  0  ,  ⋛ 0 , 1    (7’) 
Using together (7) and (7’), the R&D-technology (the production-function of new ideas) reads as: 
1 nt
t t
t
H
n n
H





 ,    (0) 0n  ,     0  ,    0  ,    ⋛ 0 ,        ,     1   (8) 
In the equations above,   is a strictly positive technological parameter and H is the aggregate 
amount of human capital available in the economy. The rate at which a researcher can generate a 
new idea ( ) is related to three different effects. The parameter  measures the traditional 
intertemporal spillover-effect arising from the existing stock of knowledge, : 0n    reflects the case 
where the rate at which a new innovation arrives declines with the number of ideas already 
discovered (“fishing-out effect”); if 0 1  , previous discoveries raise the productivity  of current 
research effort (“standing-on-shoulders effect”); 0   represents the situation in which  the arrival 
rate of new ideas is independent of the available stock of knowledge.
1441
The case 1   is ruled out 
from the analysis in order to avoid possible scale effects, whereby an increase in the level of 
available human capital may affect the rate at which new ideas are produced over time. The 
parameter   captures the effect on the arrival rate of a new innovation of the actual size of the R&D 
process (measured by the number of units of skilled labor-input actually devoted to it). A value
0   would imply that nH  is not an input to R&D-activity (Eq. 8). We rule out this unrealistic 
case by assuming that research human capital is indispensable to the discovery of new designs and 
that its contribution to the production of new ideas is always positive (i.e., 0  ). If 1  , 
doubling the number of researchers nH  would not affect the arrival rate of a new idea in Eq. (7’), so 
leading to exactly double the production of new innovations per unit of time (Eqs. 7 and 8); if 
(0;1)  due to the existence of congestion/duplication externalities (“stepping-on-toes effect”), 
increasing the number of researchers leads to a reduction of the rate at which each of them can 
discover a new idea (Eq. 7’) and to a simultaneous increase (but less than proportional) in the total 
number of new innovations produced in the unit of time (Eq. 8).
1542
 In accordance with Jones (2005, 
                                                          
14
41For a detailed discussion of the “fishing out” and “standing on shoulders” effects, see Jones (1995, 2005). 
15
42Likewise, if µ > 1, increasing the number of researchers would imply an increase (more than proportional) in the total number of 
new innovations produced in the unit of time (Eq. 8). 
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p. 1074, Eq. 16) we keep our analysis as much general as possible and impose no upper-bound to  . 
According to Eq. (8), inventing the latest idea requires a skilled-labor input equal to 
1/( )nH H n
   , which can change over time either because of the growth of n  (intertemporal 
knowledge-spillover effect), or because of the growth of H . If   is positive, an increase in 
population size would ceteris paribus lead to a rise of H  and, ultimately, to a decrease of research 
human capital productivity (an increase in nH ). The hypothesis that the productivity of human 
capital employed in research may fall due to an increase of population size can be justified by the 
fact that it becomes increasingly difficult to introduce successfully new varieties of (intermediate) 
goods in a more crowded market (R&D-difficulty grows also with the size of population, as 
suggested by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999, p. 459). In Eq. (8) a positive  measures the 
strength of this effect: all the rest being equal, the larger and the bigger the decline in the R&D 
human capital productivity following an increase of population size. On the other side, a negative  
shows that the productivity of human capital employed in research sector increases because of the 
fact that growing human capital stock leads to an increase in the ease of exchanging of ideas and 
expanding the possibilities for creating interactions between researchers.  Notice that the Jones’ 
(2005) formulation of the R&D process does not take these important features of the inventive 
activity into account.
1643
 
The R&D sector is competitive and there is free-entry. A representative R&D firm has 
instantaneous profits equal to: 
R&D firm profits = 
1 nt
nt nt nt
t
n
H
n V w H
H





 
  
 
   (9) 
where: 
( )
t
r s ds
nt i
t
V e d

 
 
  ,  t                (10) 
In the last two equations, nV denotes the value of the generic i-th intermediate firm (the one that has 
got the exclusive right of producing the i-th variety of capital goods by employing the i-th 
blueprint), i is the flow of profits accruing to the same i-th intermediate firm at date , 
                                                          
16
43When= 0 , Eq. (8) becomes: 
1
t nt tn H n
 


 , 0  , 0  , and 1  . This specification coincides with Jones (2005, Eq. 16, p. 
1074). 
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exp ( )
t
r s ds
 
 
 
 is a  present value factor which converts a unit of profit at time  into an equivalent 
unit of profit at time t , r denotes the instantaneous interest rate (the real rate of return on 
households’ asset holdings, to be introduced in a moment), and nw  is the wage rate going to one 
unit of research human capital. Eq. (9) says that profits of a representative R&D firm are equal to 
the difference between total R&D revenues (R&D output, n

, times  the  price  of  ideas, 
nV )  minus 
total R&D costs related to rival inputs (human capital employed in research, nH , times the wage  
accruing to one unit of this input, nw ).  Eq. (10), instead, reveals that the price of the generic i-th 
idea is equal to the present discounted value of the returns resulting from the production of the i-th 
variety of capital-goods by profit-making intermediate firm i. 
Using Eq. (9), the zero-profit condition in the R&D sector implies: 
1
1 nt
nt nt t nt
t
H
w n V V
H

 



                 (9’) 
2.3 Households 
The economy is closed and consists of many structurally-identical households. Therefore, 
we focus on the choices of a single infinitely-lived family with perfect foresight whose size 
coincides with the size of the whole population (L) and that owns all the firms operating in the 
economy. Each member of the household can purposefully invest in human capital. Consequently, 
the aggregate stock of this factor-input ( t t tH h L ) can rise either because population grows at a 
constant and exogenously given rate 0Lg  , or because per capita human capital, th , endogenously 
increases over time. The household uses the income it does not consume to accumulate new assets 
that take the form of ownership claims on firms. Thus: 
( )t t t t Et tA r A w H C

   ,  (0) 0A                          (11) 
where A and C denote, respectively, household’s asset holdings and consumption and 
E Y I nH uH H H H     is the fraction of the available human capital employed in production 
activities (namely,  production of consumption goods and intermediate inputs, and discovery of new 
ideas).
1744Eq. (11) suggests that household’s investment in assets (the left hand side) equals 
                                                          
17
44As already mentioned, at equilibrium all human capital employed in production activities ( EH ) is rewarded according to the same 
wage, w. 
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household’s savings (the right hand side). Household’s savings, in turn, are equal to the difference 
between household’s total income -the sum of interest income, rA, and human capital income,
EwH
- and household’s consumption (C ). Given Eq. (11), the law of motion of assets in per-capita terms 
( t t ta A L ) reads as: 
( ) ( )t t L t t t t ta r g a u h w c

    ,  (0) 0a              (11’) 
where and t t th H L  denote consumption and human capital per capita, respectively. The term – Lg  
in (11’) captures the dilution occurring in per-capita asset holdings accumulation due to population 
growth, and reflects the ‘cost’ of bringing the amount of per-capita assets of the newcomers up to 
the average level of the existing population. This formulation implies that, ceteris paribus, 
population growth tends to slow down the investment in assets of the average individual in the 
population. 
At each time 0t  , the household uses the remaining fraction (1 tu ) of tH  in educational 
assignments. Human capital per capita accumulates as: 
 (1 )t t L th u g h 

   , 0  ,  0  ,  (0) 0h              (12) 
where   and   are parameters. The first measures the productivity of education, whereas the 
second reveals the strength, if any, of the negative effect of population growth on per-capita human 
capital investment. When 1  , Eq. (12) shows the existence of a linear, one-to-one, dilution effect 
of population growth on per capita human capital accumulation  (similar to that of Eq. 11’). A 
possible explanation of such effect would be that since newborns enter the world uneducated they 
naturally reduce, ceteris paribus and at a given point in time, the existing stock of human capital per 
capita. Indeed, this effect is not presented in the original Lucas’ (1988, Eq. 13, p. 19) formulation. 
Lucas’ assumption (newborns enter the work-force endowed with a skill-level proportional to the 
level already attained by older members of the family, so population growth per se does not reduce 
the current skill level of the representative worker) is based on the social nature of human capital 
accumulation, which has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital and of any other 
form of tangible assets. When 0  , Eq. (12) is able to recover this idea (Lucas, 1988, p.19). A 
value of (0;1)   represents an intermediate case between the previous two.   
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With a Constant Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (CIES) instantaneous felicity 
function, the problem faced by a representative infinitely-lived family seeking to maximize the 
utility (attained from consumption) of its members is: 
 
 
0
1
, , ,
0
1
1
L
t t t t t
g tt
c u a h
c
Max U e dt



 
  
  
 
 ,  0Lg   ,  0              (13) 
s.t.: ( ) ( )t t L t t t t ta r g a u h w c

    ,  0;1tu  , 0t  ; 0t t LL L g

   
   (1 )t t L th u g h 

   ,  0  ;   0   
  (0) 0a  , (0) 0h   given. 
In Eq. (13) population at time 0, (0)L , has been normalized to one. The household chooses the 
optimal path of per-capita consumption ( )c and the share of human capital to be devoted to 
production activities ( )u . The other symbols have the following meaning: U and 
1 1
1
tc


 
 
 
are the 
household’s intertemporal utility function and the instantaneous felicity function of each member of 
the dynasty. We indicate by 0   the pure rate of time-preference and by 1 0   the constant 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. The hypothesis Lg   ensures that U is 
bounded away from infinity if c  remains constant over time.  
3. General Equilibrium and BGP Analysis 
Since human capital is fully employed and there exists perfect mobility of this factor-input 
across sectors, the following equalities must hold at equilibrium: 
E t t Yt It ntH u H H H H         (14) 
It ntw w        (15) 
It Ytw w        (16) 
Eq. (14) says that aggregate labor demand (the right hand side) should equal the fraction of the 
available human capital stock employed in production and R&D activities (the left hand side). Eqs. 
(15) and (16) together state that, for the previous equality to be checked, wages do adjust in such a 
way that the salary earned by one unit of skilled labor in the intermediate sector should be equal to 
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the salary earned by the same unit of skilled labor if employed in research or in  the production of 
final goods. Moreover, since household’s asset holdings must equalize the aggregate value of firms, 
the following equation should also be met in equilibrium: 
t t ntA nV        (17) 
Where is given by Eq. (10) and satisfies the usual no-arbitrage condition: 
     nt t nt tV rV 

                 
In the model, the i-th idea allows the i-th intermediate firm to produce the i-th variety of 
durables. This explains why in Eq. (17) total assets ( A ) equal the number of profit-making 
intermediate firms ( n ) times the market value ( nV ) of each of them (equal, in turn, to the price of 
the corresponding idea). On the other hand, the no-arbitrage condition suggests that the return on 
the value of the i-th intermediate firm ( t ntrV ) must be equal to the sum of the instantaneous 
monopoly profit accruing to the i-th intermediate input producer ( t ) and the capital gain/loss 
matured on ntV  during the time  interval dt, ntV

. We are now able to move to a formal definition and 
characterization of the model’s BGP equilibrium. 
DEFINITION: BGP EQUILIBRIUM 
A BGP Equilibrium in this economy is a long-run equilibrium path along which: 
(i) All variables depending on time grow at constant (possibly positive) exponential rates; 
(ii) The sectoral shares of human capital employment (
j js H H , j = Y, I, n) are constant.  
From this definition, Proposition 1 follows: 
PROPOSITION 1 
Along the BGP, the fraction of the aggregate stock of human capital employed in production 
activities is constant (that is, tu u , 0t  ). ■ 
Proof: Immediate from Eq. (12), and the fact that the growth rate of all time-dependant variables is 
constant along the BGP equilibrium. The following results do hold along the BGP (mathematical 
derivation can be found in the Appendices, Appendix A): 
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Eq. (18) gives the BGP-equilibrium growth rate of the economy’s human capital stock ( H ), and of 
the human capital employment in final output, intermediate and research sectors. Eq. (19) gives the 
BGP-equilibrium growth rate of the economy’s stock of knowledge ( n ). Eq. (20) provides the 
equilibrium real rate of return on asset holdings ( r ).  According to Eqs. (21) and (22) per capita 
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consumption ( c ), per capita asset holdings ( a ) and per capita real  income ( y Y L ) all grow at 
the same constant rate. Eq. (23) gives the allocation of the available stock of human capital between 
production and educational activities along the BGP. The equilibrium shares of the existing human 
capital stock devoted to production of ideas (
ns ), production of intermediates ( Is ) and production of 
consumption goods (
Ys ) are reported in Eqs. (24), (25) and (26), respectively. Finally, Eq. (27) 
expresses the ratio of (some function of) the two state-variables in terms of the growth rate of the 
number of ideas  (
n ), and the share of the available human capital stock devoted to R&D-activity (
ns ). It is evident from this equation that the restriction     prevents, ceteris paribus, n  to be 
independent of
tH . 
Assumption A introduces constraints on the (relationship among) the feasible values of the model’s 
parameters. 
ASSUMPTION A. Assume 
(i) 0   
(ii) 0   
(iii)
     
Max 0; ; ;
1 1 1 1 2 L
R R
R R R R g


 
   
  
             
 
(iv)    
   
     
2 1
Max 1 ; ; 1 1 1 1
1
L
L L
R g
g R g
R
 
       
                      
 
The assumption 0   comes directly from the assumptions     and 1   . This also coincides 
with Jones (2005, p. 1074, Chap. 16, Eq.16). 
If Assumption A is satisfied, then: 
PROPOSITION 2 
 H  and n  are positive; 
 
y  is positive; 
 r  is positive; 
 0 1u  ; 
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  1H nr R    . Ceteris paribus, this condition allows ntV to be positive at any time 0t   
along the BGP; 
 The two transversality conditions: lim 0at t
t
a

  and lim 0ht t
t
h

  are simultaneously 
checked along the BGP. 
Proof: When (i) and (iii) in Assumption A are met, then the denominator of Eqs. (18), (19), (20) and 
(22) is positive, i.e.  1 0R         . Given this, and the fact that in the model 0Lg   and 
0  , we conclude that: (i)-(ii)-(iii) ensure  1H nr R    ,  0r  , 0u  , and the respect of the 
two transversality conditions; (i)-(iii)-(iv) ensure 0, 0y H    and 0n  . Finally, (i)-(ii)-(iii)-(iv) 
ensure 1u   . ■ 
4. Population Growth and Economic Growth 
The following theorem analyzes the interaction between population and economic growth 
rates in this economy. 
THEOREM  
Assume that parameter-restrictions (i) and (iii) of Assumption A are checked for 0   and  0  . 
Then; 
 When the dilution effect of population growth on human capital investment is greater than 
one  1   , the correlation between population and economic growth rates is ambiguous, 
i.e. 0, 0, 0.
y y y
L L Lg g g
    
  
  
 
 When 0 1  , there exists an unambiguously positive correlation between population 
growth and economic growth, i.e. 0.
y
Lg



 
Results are summarized in Table 1 (mathematical derivation can be found in Appendix B). 
When 0; 0R      
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The intuition behind the results of Theorem is as follows. By using again the BGP-equilibrium 
relation: 
y H n LR g          (28) 
One can observe that 
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         (29) 
According to Eq. (29), the impact of population growth on real per-capita income depends on the 
relative contribution of two distinct effects: 
- The direct dilution effect: This effect is always negative since when newborns enter the 
world they reduce the existing per-capita stock of any reproducible factor–input. So, in order 
to equip every single member of the growing population with a given (per capita) amount of 
such input, some resources need to be explicitly devoted to this aim, which slows 
productivity growth down. 
- The indirect ideas effect: This effect describes the impact that at a certain point in time an 
exogenous change of population size (due to a change of Lg ) may have on the  economy’s 
growth rate of ideas ( n ), and hence on N: “…More people means more Isaac Newtons and 
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therefore more ideas…” (Jones, 2003, p. 505). Unlike the previous one, this effect is always 
positive as long as 1 0    .
1845
 
 
According to Table 1, when 1   the impact of population growth on economic growth is 
always positive.  However; when 1  , a threshold level of   has emerged. In particularly, when 
  is below the threshold, the ideas effect of population growth is positive and greater than the 
dilution effect. As a result of this, the impact of population growth on economic growth continues to 
be positive under a certain threshold level of dilution effect. When   equals to the threshold, the 
dilution effect neutralizes the ideas effect which is still positive, and thus; the impact of population 
growth on per-capita income growth is neutral. And lastly when   is above the threshold, the 
dilution effect of population growth is quite strong that results a negative impact on economic 
growth. Note that If is sufficiently high  1 0    ; the ideas effect of population growth can 
also turn to negative.  
5. Empirical Analyses  
5.1 An Exercise: Testing the Theory for Advanced Countries 
This empirical part is a modest attempt to analyze the sign relationship between population 
growth and economic growth under the light of our theoretical model. As it is demonstrated in 
Table 1, the dilution effect of population growth on human capital investment has a key role in 
explaining the non-linear effects of population growth on economic growth. Eq. (29) also reveals 
that under BGP-equilibrium relation, unambiguous impacts of population growth on economic 
growth can be explained trough the net impact of two distinct effects of population growth; the 
indirect ideas effect and the direct dilution effect.  
The objective of this part is also twofold. First, it aims to demonstrate the impact of 
population growth on economic growth. Second is to point out what extent the empirical results can 
confirm the Table 1 results. In order to check our objectives, we benefitted from two different 
approaches and two different data sets: In the first approach we intend to analyze the impact of 
population growth on economic growth in advanced countries. We employed a panel fixed effect 
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, the ideas effect is positive as long as 1    and 
Assumption A are met. According to Eq.29, for a while suppose that the indirect ideas effect is zero and hence 0y Lg  
 . 
Therefore, we can accurately say that when 
 
is below or equal to the threshold level, 
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analysis for twenty-two countries by using Penn World Table Data set. Then, in order to compare 
the results of first approach with Table 1, a panel structural VAR model based on Blanchard and 
Quah (1989) was employed by using an updated data set of Barro and Lee (2013).  
5.2 Panel Fixed Effect Analysis with Penn World Table Data (2013) 
5.2.1 Methodology and Data  
In order to measure the effects of population growth in advanced countries we mainly focus 
on equations (12) and (22) in which the human capital accumulation and per-capita income growth 
rate are given respectively. The crucial point is that population growth Lg  takes place in both 
equations, and is the only explanatory variable in Eq. (22) along the BGP analysis. 
 
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According to our theoretical part, the population growth not only has a direct dilution effect on 
human capital accumulation but also has an indirect effect coming from its impact on the allocation 
of the available stock of human capital between production ( )u  and educational activity (1 )u . If we 
reconsider the Eq. (23) the indirect effect of population growth can be shown as the following form: 
 (1 ) Lu F g  . Since there are no available data for (1 )u  what we estimate for Eq. (12) would 
give us the direct effect of population growth on human capital accumulation. In order to 
distinguish the allocation effect (1 )u  and the direct dilution effect of population growth ( )Lg on 
human capital accumulation we need a good proxy for (1 )u  which may be obtained from micro 
founded data from surveys.  
Barro and Lee (2001), Gong et al. (2004), Cohen and Soto (2007),  Kubik (2010) and 
Hartwig (2014) reveal that defining a proxy for human capital is the most challenging and 
controversial part in empirical studies because of the lack of a clear description on how to measure 
human capital variables, and because of the questions on the quality of the data on human capital 
itself. To reduce the questions on the quality and the reliability issue and to explain the sign 
relationship between population growth and economic growth we use Penn World Table Data 
(Feenstra et al. 2013) which also provides an index of human capital per-person based on years of 
schooling (Barro and Lee, 2013) and returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994).  
74 
 
We ultimately estimate the following equations by panel least squares method: 
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In above mentioned equations, variables , , ,,i t i t i tgy gL gh  and ,i tcapf are per-capita income 
growth, population growth, per-capita human capital growth and share of gross capital formation 
for country i  at time t  respectively. According to Eq. (22), population growth is the only 
independent variable explaining the per-capita income growth rate. However for the regressions of 
economic growth, it is even more important to include some control variables such as share of gross 
capital formation (or in other words; physical capital investment) and per-capita human capital 
growth. In particularly the physical capital is one the most significant variable in explaining the 
growth differences among countries. Therefore estimating the regressions without adding control 
variables would probably lead misspecifications in results. The data about the all variables in the 
analysis are taken from the Penn World Table Dataset and our sample consists of a panel of twenty-
two advanced countries including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States for the period of 
1951 – 2010. The observations are taken annually.  
Table 2. Panel Fixed Effect Estimations with Penn Table Data (2013) 
 
Variables 
gy 
(1) 
gy 
(2) 
gy 
(3) 
gh 
(4) 
 
constant 
 
0.024581*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.024557*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.006073 
(0.3290) 
 
0.005837*** 
(0.0000) 
gL 0.642992** 
(0.0117) 
0.642666** 
(0.0119) 
0.442827* 
(0.0908) 
0.079216** 
(0.0194) 
gh 
 
0.004117 
(0.9843) 
0.023852 
(0.9089) 
 
capf   
0.077039*** 
(0.0012) 
 
 
Note: The values in parentheses give the p-values. 
***
 Variables are significant at 1% level 
**
  Variables are significant at 5% level 
* 
   Variable is significant at 10% level 
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5.2.2 Empirical Results 
At first glance, Table 2 reveals that population growth is statistically significant and appears 
in all regressions with positive sign. The regression result at column (4) demonstrates that the 
impact of population growth on human capital accumulation is statistically significant and positive. 
The reason lying behind this result may come from the construction method of the index of human 
capital per-capita. Feenstra et al. (2013) might have not taken a human capital formulation such as 
what we based on the modified version of Uzawa-Lucas into account. However, from this result it 
can be inferred that in advanced countries, an exogenous change of population size leads an 
increase in stock of human capital, and as a result of an increase in human capital stock, we can 
infer that population growth leads more ideas in advanced economies. In theoretical part, we found 
that as long as the indirect ideas effect of population growth is greater than the direct dilution effect 
of population growth, the economic growth is affected positively by population growth. As it is 
seen from Table 2 columns (1), (2) and (3), the impact of population growth on economic growth is 
statistically significant and positive in advanced countries. From this perspective, this result is 
therefore consistent with our benchmark theoretical model (see Eqs. (28) and (29)).  
5.3 Panel Structural VAR Analyses with Barro-Lee (2013) Data 
5.3.1 Methodology and Data 
In previous section we showed that an exogenous increase in population growth leads a 
positive impact on economic growth in advanced countries. In the light of this finding, according to 
our theoretical results (Table 1) we can infer that the parameter showing the strength of the dilution 
effect of population growth ( ) must correspond a value between zero and the threshold level, 
1 2
0
1
R
R

 
 
 
 where the indirect ideas effect is greater than the direct dilution effect of 
population growth.      
In order to check the theoretical and empirical results we obtained, a system of simultaneous 
equations composed of above-mentioned equations (12), (22) including Eq. (23) comes as a 
necessity.  
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This section uses a panel structural vector autoregression (panel SVAR) model based on a 
long run identification restrictions provided by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and in turn related with 
Lee et al. (2012) to estimate relationships among four variables; population growth, human capital 
accumulation, average years of schooling (allocation effect) and economic growth. Before going 
into the details of the econometric technique, a brief description of data we used in this analysis is 
summarized below.  
The challenging part of the estimation is that since there are no good proxy for (1 )u , here 
we used the average years of schooling data of Barro and Lee (2013) to replace the allocation effect 
variable. The reason why we used Barro-Lee data set can be justified as the followings: First, This 
data is composed of the distribution of educational attainment of the adult population over age 15 
with all levels of education – non-educated, primary, secondary and tertiary – for 146 countries. 
Second, their earlier estimates (Barro and Lee, 1993, 1996 and 2001) have been widely used in 
many studies related to growth models with human capital investment. Third, their estimations on 
educational attainment provide a reasonable and detailed proxy for human capital in a broad group 
of countries that also ease to make comparisons among different country groups over the long run. 
And forth, they provide average years of schooling data which is considered useful in constructing 
the index of human capital per-capital (Feenstra et al. , 2013)  and to measure the stock of human 
capital in growth regressions (De la Fuente and Doménech, 2006).  
To estimate the linkage among the equations (12), (22) and (23) we need data for four 
variables: Population growth rate ,i tgL , the time allocated to build up human capital accumulation
(1 )u , the growth rates of per-capita income , ,i tgy and of per-capita human capital ,i tgh . As we 
stated above for (1 )u  we used average years of schooling.  For the growth rate of per-capita 
human capital or in other words, the human capital accumulation; we compute the growth rates of a 
fraction ( / )h H L  which is obtained by dividing the total number of individuals who completed 
enrolments to the numbers of individuals who enrolled at least even one day in total population over 
age 15. This is done for two major reasons. First in our theoretical model we do not make any 
distinction of human capital according to the level of educational attainment. Therefore in this part 
we assume that an individual who completed at least primary education or more can be accepted as 
a human capital. This means that the stock of human capital H  would equal to the sum of the 
individuals who completed either primary or secondary or tertiary education. Second, in our 
theoretical model we assume that the allocation of available stock of human capital between 
production and educational activities are restricted by the condition 0 1u   of Proposition 2. This 
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proposition implies that while constructing the per-capita human capital proxy we cannot consider a 
population including the individuals who did not enrol to any specific level of education. Therefore 
this non-educated population rate of Barro-Lee (2013) can correspond to the case where 1u   in 
our theoretical setting.
19
46Therefore; the reason of considering the total population L  as the numbers 
of total enrolled people in the population over age 15 is also consistent with what set up 
theoretically in the previous part. For example, if an increase in population growth affects schooling 
(time spent for education or in other words allocation effect,1 u ) negatively, and due to this 
negative effect if completion rates have been falling, we may have an idea to consider a direct 
dilution effect of population growth on human capital accumulation as we assumed in theoretical 
model. For the other two variables; the growth rate of per-capita income and the growth rate of 
population (exogenous variable), we benefitted from the World Bank data set for the years between 
1965 and 2010. All annual observations have been transformed to averages over periods of 5 years 
in order to avoid the possible business cycle effects. 
As it is stated before, we use a panel structural VAR model with four mentioned variables to 
analyze the relationship between the variables in a system of simultaneous equations. The model, 
which is theoretically identified from the reduced-form of VAR model (see Appendix C) takes the 
following form:  
, , ,( )i t i t i tX L X u    
where ,i tX  is a (4 1)  vector including , , ,gy gL sch gh  , L is a lag operator, ( )L  is a (4 4)  
coefficient matrix and ,i tu  is the vector for random shocks for country i  at time t . We consider 
structural restrictions for the theoretical identification of a typical VAR model. First we estimate a 
panel VAR through pooled fixed effects. Then, the theoretical restrictions are imposed according to 
the model based on Blanchard and Quah (1989). This method allows us to add an exogenous 
variable- such as population growth- into the estimation. The reason why we used Panel SVAR 
analysis can be justified because of this relaxation. However this estimation deals with 7 restrictions 
where the model is an over-identified with one more restriction than a just-identification. 
                                                          
19
46Gong et al. (2004 p. 406) emphasize that human capital comprises a person’s stock of knowledge and abilities which 
is not only acquired by formal education (schooling) but also acquired by informal education which may take job 
trainings, physical and mental fitness, social services into account as well. However the authors also underline that a 
human capital formulation which is based on the Uzawa-Lucas model merely rests on the result of the time dedicated to 
the formal education. Therefore, we do not consider the other forms of human capital in this analysis. 
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The coefficient matrix ( )L  for the vector  , , , ,i tX gy gL sch gh

  and long run constraints are 
given as the following: 
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According to this form, economic growth is affected by population growth and per-capita 
human capital growth (as a control variable) but not influenced by schooling variable (first 
restriction denoted by 0 in the first row of coefficient matrix). Population growth is not influenced 
by any other variable because it is exogenously given in the theoretical model. (second, third and 
fourth restrictions are applied). Schooling or allocation effect (1 )u is influenced by population 
growth (fifth and sixth restrictions are applied for economic growth and per-capita human capital 
growth respectively). And lastly, population growth and schooling affect the change in growth of 
per-capita human capital in the long run (seventh restriction is applied for economic growth).   
Table 3. Panel SVAR Estimations with Barro-Lee Data (2013) 
 
1965 – 2010   N: 168 Coefficients Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
 
C(1) 
 
1.236241 
 
0.073457 
 
16.82946 
 
0.0000 
C(2) 0.103713 0.028556  3.631950 0.0003 
C(3) -6.380836 0.388033 -16.44404 0.0000 
C(4) -0.025457  0.005164 -4.929374 0.0000 
C(5) 0.036318 0.004420 8.216095 0.0000 
 Chi-Square:  293.7415  Prob. 0.0000    Long-run test for over identification 
5.3.2 Empirical Results 
The results from the data of 21 advanced countries (excluding Germany)
20
47 for the period of 
1965 – 2010 have revealed that there exists a dilution effect of population growth on human capital 
accumulation which is negative and significant (coefficient C(4): -0.025, 0.025  ). This 
estimation is consistent with our Table 1 results for 0 1   in which population growth affects 
per-capita income growth rate positively (coefficient C(1): 1.24).  We also found that the impact of 
                                                          
20
47We exclude Germany due to the data availability. 
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population growth on time spent for education (1 )u  statistically significant and negative. 
(coefficient C(3): -6.38). Table 2 also reveals that the sigma parameter of Eq. (12) in the theoretical 
part is statistically significant and positive 0   (coefficient C(5) 0.036). It implies that the 
marginal product of education in the process of human capital accumulation is positive in advanced 
countries. This finding is consistent with our parametric restriction (ii) of Assumption A.
2148
  
6. Conclusion 
Given the last population facts of the UN and all the results of the literature, it seems that 
population growth will hold the questions about its effects on economic prosperity. This paper 
therefore attempts to understand the sign of the relationship between population growth and per-
capita income growth. While doing this, the paper provides an alternative but complementary 
theoretical framework explaining the impacts of population growth on economic growth under 
endogenous technological change and human capital investment by the economic agents along the 
BGP equilibrium.  
The theoretical part of the paper has showed that an increase in the population growth 
(regardless of the source of demographic change such as fertility, mortality or ageing) rate yields an 
ambiguous (positive, negative or else neutral) impact on the growth rate of per-capita income. This 
ambiguity comes from the relative contribution of two distinct effects of population growth: The 
direct dilution effect and the indirect ideas effect. The direct dilution effect mainly rests on the 
modification of Lucas (1988) formulation of human capital accumulation. The present paper has 
showed that (i) The dilution effect has a central role in explaining the ambiguous impact of 
population growth on economic growth. (ii) There exists a threshold level of the dilution effect that 
the correlation between population and economic growth rates may be either positive or negative or 
neutral according to this threshold. (iii) When the dilution effect is sufficiently low, 0 1  , an 
unambiguously positive correlation between population growth and economic growth is obtained. 
                                                          
21
48It is important to here that Gong et al. (2004 p. 403) argue that estimating the original Uzawa-Lucas models yields a 
negative 0   value which does not make sense since it would imply a negative marginal product of education in the 
process generating human capital. According to them, the original Uzawa-Lucas model will not be compatible with the 
time series. Unlike Gong et al. (2004), we are capable of finding a positive marginal product of education for the 
advanced countries by employing a panel structural VAR model. However in developing countries, like Gong et al. 
(2004), we also find a negative sigma value. In the benchmark theoretical model we do not assume a negative impact of 
education. Negativity in   violates the parameter-restriction (ii) of Assumption A and as a result of this, an estimation 
for developing countries not cannot be done.    
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Another result of the paper is that more population growth generates an indirect ideas effect 
(ambiguous) on the rate of innovation and economic growth. 
 The second part of the paper is a modest attempt to test our theoretical findings empirically 
by benefitting from two different approaches: Panel fixed effect analysis and panel structural VAR 
analysis. First approach reveals that the impact of population growth on economic growth has been 
positive in twenty-two advanced countries between the years of 1951-2010. This result implies that 
the dilution effect of population growth on human capital accumulation should be sufficiently low 
in those countries. In order to measure the strength of the dilution effect, a system of simultaneous 
equations is set and a panel SVAR analysis (with long-run restrictions) is employed. This analysis 
supports that a dilution effect of population growth on human capital accumulation exists and is 
below then 1 and thus, threshold level. This result partially confirms the Table 1 results of the first 
part. We empirically demonstrate that when 0 1  , there exists an unambiguously positive 
correlation between population growth and economic growth 0y Lg    in advanced countries. 
This finding also confirms why indirect ideas effect of population growth is greater than the direct 
dilution effect of population growth in advanced economies. 
In order to confirm the theoretical results for 1   we need further empirical investigations 
for different country groups instead of making tests based on regional classifications. In both two 
empirical analyses, advanced countries do not solely depend on a regional block, and we are able to 
get partial results, however in Barro-Lee (2013) data set, developing countries are categorized in 
regional blocks. By using different classifications - such as income levels - one may find 
statistically significant results for the impact of dilution effect of population growth on economic 
growth in developing countries.  
Lastly, we believe that these findings shed new lights on the determinants of the ambiguous 
impacts of population growth on economic growth, and will help to introduce more realistic models 
to the literature of modern growth theory with human capital accumulation. We underline that 
further empirical research (e.g. a panel data or  standard VAR analyses with good proxies for 
human capital and allocation effect) would be a good extension to verify the all theoretical results 
we obtained.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: EQS. (18) – (27) 
The Hamiltonian function  tJ  related to the intertemporal problem (13) in the body-text is: 
       
1 1
1
1
Lg tt
t at t L t t t t t ht t L t
c
J e r g a u h w c u g h
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  
                
, 
Where at and ht  are the co-state variables associated, respectively, to the state variables ta  and th . 
The necessary FOCs are: 
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along with the two transversality conditions: 
lim 0, lim 0,at t ht t
t t
a h 
 
   
and the initial conditions:   
   0 0, 0 0.a h   
Combining (A2) and (A4) yields: 
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Eqs. (A3) and (A2) imply, respectively: 
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(A6)  at t L
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Combination of (A5), (A6) and (A7) leads to: 
(A8)  1 tt L
t
w
r g
w
 

     
Since human capital is perfectly mobile across sectors, at equilibrium it will be rewarded according 
to the same wage: Yt It nt tw w w w   . Moreover, along the BGP this common wage would grow at 
a constant exponential rate, implying that Yt It nt t
Yt It nt t
w w w w
w w w w
   
    is constant. Accordingly, in the 
BGP equilibrium the real rate of return on asset holdings, r will be constant (Eq. A8). With r 
constant, and making use of Eqs. (6) and (10) in the main text, we find that along the BGP: 
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For any 0 1, 0, 0, 0,Y IZ H H n     and 0, ntR V  is positive provided that: 
(A9’)  1H nr R     
Given ntV , from Eq. (9’) in the main text: 
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where n nt ts H H  is constant along the BGP. We can now use Eqs. (5), (2) and (4’) in the main 
text, obtaining: 
(A11) 
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From Eq. (15) in the main text, by equalizing (A11) and (A10) in this appendix one gets: 
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Combining Eqs. (1) and (4’) in the text: 
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From (16) in the main text and (A12) above, equalization of Eqs. (A11) and (A13) in this appendix 
delivers: 
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Along the BGP all variables depending on time grow at constant rates and the sector shares of 
human capital employment are also constant. Therefore, from Eq. (8) in the main text: 
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If 1     we have a very special case of the model in which human and technological capital 
grow at the same rate n H     along the BGP. We rule out this possibility and analyze the most 
geneal possible case: 1       . 
Using Eqs. (A10), (A11), (A13) and (A15) we see that along the BGP wages grow at a common and 
constant rate: 
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Combining Eqs. (A1) and (A6), the usual Euler equation follows: 
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From (17) in the text and (A9) in this appendix we conclude that along the BGP: 
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Merging (11’) in the main text and (A6) in this appendix yields: 
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    where , 0tu u t   along the BGP. 
Instead, from the combination of (12) in the text and (A5) in this appendix we get: 
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Eqs. (A7), (A15’), (A17), (A18) and (A19) together lead to: 
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 where h H Lg    has been used. 
Using (12) in the main text, Eqs. (A15’), (A17) and (A20) and the fact that
   1 1H h L Lg u g          one obtains: 
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where    0 , 0h w and  0a are the initial values (i.e., at 0t  ) of th , tw  and ta , respectively. With u  
constant, the just-mentioned initial values given, and 0   the last equation implies: 
(A21) c a   
This means that along the BGP ta and tc  grow at the same rate. Using (A21) and equating (A16) and 
(A17) it is possible to get: 
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Next, by equalizing (A22) to (A8), and using (A15’): 
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Equating (A23) to (A15), and solving for
H , we finally obtain: 
(A23’) 
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Given
H  , it is possible to re-cast n  as: 
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Eqs. (A23’) and (A23’’) confirm that
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The BGP equilibrium- value of r is obtained by combining (A22), (A23’) and 
(A23’’): 
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Eqs. (A21) and (A16) together imply:   
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     , where r is given by Eq. (A22’). 
After using Eq. (12) in the main text, the definition of h H L and the fact that LL L g

 , we 
conclude: 
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Equalization of (A23’) and (A24) allows obtaining the BGP equilibrium value of u: 
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From (1) in the text, (A22’), (A23’) and (A23’’) in this appendix, the hypothesis of symmetry (Eq. 
4’ in the text), the definitions of   , 1y Y L R Z     and LL L g

 , we obtain the growth rate 
of real per-capita output along the BGP: 
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We now compute the BGP-equilibrium values of ,n Is s  and Ys . Eq. (14) in the main text suggests: 
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From (A14) in this appendix we use 
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 into the expression above and obtain: 
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, where u is given by (A25). 
Hence: 
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According to (A14), however, it is also true that: 
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Equating this expression to (A28) yields: 
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From Eq. (8) in the body-text: 
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Equalization of (A29) and (A30) leads to: 
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Given Eqs. (A22’), (A23’), (A23’’), (A25) and (A31), it is possible to compute the BGP ratio
1
tH
n




 
(by using either Eq. 29 or Eq. A30), along with
Is  and Ys  (Eqs. A27 and A28). 
Finally, by employing Eqs. (A6), (A7), (A15’), (A17) and the definition of h H L  , it can be 
showed that along the BGP the two transversality conditions lim 0, lim 0at t ht t
t t
a h 
 
  are 
simultaneously checked when: H nr R    
In turn, when the two transversality conditions are met, then the requirement (Eq. A9’): 
 1H nr R     is also met, for any positive.        ■ 
APPENDIX B: TABLE 1 
   
 
2 1
1
y
L
R
g R
 
 
       
   
 
When (i) and (iii) in Assumption A in the main text are met,  1 0R        is always satisfied. 
With 0, 0,R     and 0  we conclude: 
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    
    
    
 

 
 
 
 
   
1 2
0 2 1 0
1
y
L
R
R
g R

  
  
         
     
 
   
1 2
0 2 1 0
1
y
L
R
R
g R

  
  
         
    
 
 
   
1
1 0
1 1
y y
L L
R R
if
g R R g
 

   
          
         
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 
   
   
2 1 2 1
0 0
1 1
y y
L L
R R
if
g R R g
 

   
             
       
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APPENDIX C: REDUCED FORM OF PANEL VAR MODEL 
An unrestricted VAR model where 
tX  is the vector of variables in question and tu is the vector of 
random shocks 
1 1( )t t tX A L X A Bu
     
After having arranged the unrestricted VAR model, we obtain: 
1 1 1[ ( )]t tX I A L A Bu
      
Equation above reflects how random shocks affect the long run levels of the variables. Given the 
matrix 1 1 1[ ( )]C I A L A B     , the aggregate effect of the random shock tu  is given by the matrix 
C.  Long run impact is obtained by the cumulative effect of the random shock tu  on tX . The matrix 
C for the vector  , , ,tX gy gL sch gh

  is therefore given in the main text as the as the following 
form: 
C = 
0
0 0 0
0 0
0
NA NA NA
NA
NA NA
NA NA NA
 
 
 
 
 
 
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